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The Hon Tony Abbott MP 
Prime Minister 
Parliament House 
CANBERRA ACT 2600
Dear Prime Minister
I am pleased to present my annual report for the period 1 July 2013–30 June 2014.
This report has been prepared in accordance with section 35 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence 
and Security Act 1986 and reflects the Requirements for annual reports – for departments, executive 
agencies and FMA Act bodies, as approved by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, and 
updated in May 2014.
Each of the agencies within my jurisdiction has confirmed that those components of the report  
which relate to them will not prejudice security, the defence of Australia, Australia’s relations with 
other countries, law enforcement operations or the privacy of individuals. The report is therefore 
suitable to be laid before each House of Parliament.
The report includes my office’s audited financial statements as required by section 57 of the  
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997.
As required by the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, I certify that my office has undertaken  
a fraud risk assessment and has a fraud control plan, both of which are reviewed periodically. I  
further certify that appropriate fraud prevention, detection, investigation and reporting procedures 
are in place, which comply with the guidelines applying in 2013–14, and that the office has 
responded to the mandatory Australian Institute of Criminology annual survey of fraud control data.
Yours sincerely
Vivienne Thom 
Inspector-General
30 September 2014
1 National Circuit BARTON ACT 2600 Phone (02) 6271 5692 Fax (02) 6271 5696 
 E-mail info@igis.gov.au
www.igis.gov.au
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IGIS Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
IGIS Act Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986
IMA irregular maritime arrival
Immigration Department of Immigration and Citizenship (before 18 September 2013)
Department of Immigration and Border Protection (from 18 September 2013)
ISA Intelligence Services Act 2001
MOU memorandum of understanding
OIGIS Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
ONA Office of National Assessments
ONA Act Office of National Assessments Act 1977
PGPA Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013
PID Act Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013
SES Senior Executive Service
TIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979
WHS Act Work Health and Safety Act 2011
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PART ONE: OVERVIEW
The role of the Inspector-General 
of Intelligence and Security
The Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security (IGIS) is an independent statutory office 
established by the Inspector-General of Intelligence 
and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) which commenced 
on 1 February 1987. Dr Vivienne Thom was 
appointed as Inspector-General for a term of  
five years from 19 July 2010.
The Office of the IGIS (OIGIS) is situated within 
the Prime Minister’s portfolio. As an independent 
statutory office holder, the IGIS is not subject to 
general direction from the Prime Minister, or other 
ministers, on how responsibilities under the IGIS 
Act should be carried out.
The role of the IGIS is set out in the IGIS Act and 
is, broadly, to assist ministers in overseeing and 
reviewing the legality and propriety of Australian 
intelligence agencies’ activities, to assist ministers 
in ensuring that these activities are consistent 
with human rights, and to assist the Government 
in assuring the Parliament and the public that 
intelligence and security matters relating to 
Commonwealth agencies are open to scrutiny.
Regular inspections of the intelligence agencies 
are designed to identify issues, including with 
agencies’ governance and control frameworks, 
before there is a requirement for major  
remedial action.
IGIS’s inspection role is complemented by an 
inquiry function. In undertaking inquiries the IGIS 
has strong investigative powers, akin to those 
of a royal commission, including the power to 
compel persons to answer questions and produce 
documents, to take sworn evidence, and to enter 
agency premises.
The IGIS can investigate complaints, including 
complaints by members of the public or staff of  
an intelligence agency, about an action taken  
by an intelligence agency.
The IGIS also has a role under the Archives Act 1983 
and the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) 
to provide expert evidence to the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal and the Information 
Commissioner in relation to national security, 
defence, international relations and confidential 
foreign government communications exemptions.
The role and functions of the IGIS are an important 
part of the overall accountability framework 
applied to the intelligence agencies. The focus 
of the IGIS on intelligence agencies’ operational 
activities complements Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security and 
Australian National Audit Office oversight of  
other aspects of governance in those agencies.
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Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO)
ASIO’s main role is to gather information and 
produce intelligence that will enable it to warn the 
government about activities that might endanger 
Australia’s national security.
The organisation’s functions are set out in the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
(ASIO Act). ASIO is also subject to guidelines issued 
by the Attorney-General under the ASIO Act.
Security is defined in the ASIO Act as the protection 
of the Commonwealth and the States and Territories 
and the people in them from:
 u espionage
 u sabotage
 u politically motivated violence
 u the promotion of communal violence
 u attacks on Australia’s defence system
 u acts of foreign interference
and fulfilling Australia’s responsibilities to any foreign 
country in relation to any of these matters.
Security under the ASIO Act also encompasses 
the protection of Australia’s territorial and border 
integrity from serious threats.
ASIO collects information using a variety of 
intelligence methods including the use of human 
sources, special powers authorised by warrant, 
authorised liaison relationships, and published 
sources.
The Attorney-General is responsible for ASIO.
Australian Secret Intelligence  
Service (ASIS)
ASIS’s primary function is to obtain and 
communicate intelligence not readily available by 
other means, about the capabilities, intentions and 
activities of individuals or organisations outside 
Australia. Further functions set out in the Intelligence 
Services Act 2001 (ISA) include communicating 
secret intelligence in accordance with government 
requirements, conducting counter-intelligence 
activities and liaising with foreign intelligence or 
security services.
ASIS’s collection of relevant foreign intelligence 
generally relies on human sources. This intelligence 
information is transformed into intelligence reports 
and related products which are made available to key 
policy makers and select government agencies with 
a clear and established need to know.
Under the ISA, ASIS’s activities are regulated 
by a series of ministerial directions, ministerial 
authorisations and privacy rules.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs is responsible for ASIS.
Office of National Assessments (ONA)
ONA is established by the Office of National 
Assessments Act 1977 (ONA Act) and provides  
‘all source’ assessments on international political, 
strategic and economic developments to the 
Prime Minister and the Government. ONA uses 
information collected by other intelligence and 
government agencies, diplomatic reporting and 
open sources, including the media, to support  
its analysis.
Under its Act, ONA is responsible for coordinating 
and reviewing Australia’s foreign intelligence 
activities and issues of common interest in 
Australia’s foreign intelligence community, and 
the adequacy of resourcing provided to Australia’s 
foreign intelligence effort.
The Prime Minister is responsible for ONA.
Defence intelligence agencies
Three of the six intelligence agencies are within 
the Department of Defence (Defence): the Defence 
Intelligence Organisation (DIO), the Defence 
Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), also 
known as the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence 
Organisation, and the Defence Signals Directorate 
(DSD), also known as the Australian Signals 
Directorate.1 These three agencies sit within the 
1 The 2013 Defence White Paper announced changes to the names 
of the Defence Signals Directorate and the Defence Imagery 
Geospatial Organisation to the Australian Signals Directorate 
and Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation respectively. 
Legislation to give effect to these changes was introduced shortly 
after the reporting period.
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Intelligence and Security Group in Defence. The 
functions of DSD and DIGO are set out in the ISA 
and their activities are regulated by a series of 
ministerial directions, ministerial authorisations  
and privacy rules.
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)
DIO is Defence’s strategic-level, all-source 
intelligence assessment agency. Its role is to 
provide independent intelligence assessment, 
advice and services in support of: the planning 
and conduct of ADF operations; Defence strategic 
policy and wider government planning and 
decision making on defence and national security 
issues; and the development and sustainment of 
Defence capability.
Defence Imagery and Geospatial  
Organisation (DIGO)
DIGO is Australia’s national geospatial intelligence 
agency. DIGO’s geospatial intelligence, derived 
from the fusion of analysis of imagery and 
geospatial data, informs Australian Government 
and Defence Force decision making. DIGO  
directly assists Commonwealth and state  
bodies responding to security threats and  
natural disasters.
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD)
DSD is Australia’s national authority on signals 
intelligence and information security. DSD collects 
foreign signals intelligence, and its reports on this 
intelligence are provided to key policy makers 
and select government agencies with a clear and 
established need to know the information.
The Minister for Defence is responsible for these 
Defence agencies.
Inspector-General’s Review 
The year in review
Highlights 
The ongoing challenge for the office is to adapt 
to changes in the operations and powers of 
the intelligence agencies while maintaining 
effectiveness, credibility and transparency in our 
oversight role.
We have had to be flexible and innovative;  
we have
 u taken a risk-based approach to prioritising our 
work. This necessitated greater engagement 
with agencies to understand their compliance 
risks and anticipate future areas of risk. Using 
this approach we have maintained inspections 
of ASIO, ASIS and DSD but fewer resources have 
been allocated to DIGO, DIO and the ONA
 u continued to publicly report findings 
and recommendations of inquiries to 
the maximum extent consistent with the 
protection of national security
 u commented on the development of policy 
and legislation, where appropriate, to ensure 
that any new agency powers have provision 
for appropriate oversight
 u adapted to systems developments in agencies, 
altering our programs to take advantage 
of these developments and encouraging 
agencies to build compliance into new 
business processes. 
Dr Vivienne Thom,  
Inspector-General
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workload. Completed inquiries examined:
 u the attendance of legal representatives at  
ASIO interviews
 u the actions of ASIO, the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) and the then Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) in respect 
of an Egyptian irregular maritime arrival who 
was placed in immigration detention and was 
the subject of an Interpol red notice
 u the use of weapons and self-defence 
techniques in ASIS staff.
A major project for the office was the successful 
implementation of the Australian Government’s 
Public Interest Disclosure scheme which began in 
January 2014. 
Legislative changes
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (PID Act) 
commenced on 15 January 2014. The PID 
scheme is intended to promote integrity and 
accountability in the Commonwealth public sector 
by establishing a framework to facilitate reporting 
of suspected wrongdoing and ensure timely and 
effective investigation of these disclosures. Public 
officials who make disclosures under the scheme 
are protected from adverse consequences.
Key IGIS responsibilities include:
 u receiving and, where appropriate, investigating 
disclosures about suspected wrongdoing 
within the intelligence agencies
 u assisting current or former public officials 
employed, or previously employed, by 
intelligence agencies, in relation to the 
operation of the PID Act
 u assisting the intelligence agencies in meeting 
their responsibilities under the PID Act, 
including through education and awareness 
activities
 u overseeing the operation of the PID scheme in 
the intelligence agencies.
During the second half of 2013, my staff worked 
closely with the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
in developing cross-government guidance 
to assist the operation of the new scheme, 
particularly the ‘Agency Guide to the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 2013’ published by the 
Ombudsman, which includes specific advice 
concerning the intelligence community. I also 
liaised closely with the intelligence agencies to 
ensure the PID scheme was implemented fully 
on 15 January 2014. All intelligence agencies as 
well as OIGIS had all necessary appointments and 
administrative arrangements in place to receive 
and handle disclosures —this was a higher level 
of compliance at commencement than for the 
rest of the Commonwealth Government sector. 
The intelligence agencies have also undertaken a 
range of awareness-raising and training activities 
concerning the operation of the scheme, some 
involving assistance from OIGIS staff.
Parliamentary oversight 
I appeared before the Senate Standing 
Committee on Finance and Public Administration 
on 18 November 2013 during the 2013–14 
Supplementary Budget Estimates hearings, on 
24 February 2014 during the 2013–14 Additional 
Budget Estimates hearings, and on 26 May 2014 
during the 2014–15 Budget Estimates hearings. 
Decisions by the judiciary, tribunals or 
the Information Commissioner
No judicial decisions or decisions of administrative 
tribunals or of the Information Commissioner 
made in 2013–14 had, or may have, a significant 
impact on the operations of the office.
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Submissions to inquiries and reviews 
On 13 February 2014, I gave an introductory 
briefing to the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Intelligence and Security. On 20 February 2014, 
I made a submission to the Committee for the 
Review of Administration and Expenditure No. 12 
(2012–13) Australian Intelligence Agencies and 
appeared before this Committee at a private 
hearing on 15 May 2014.
On 26 February 2014, I made a submission to the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References 
Committee for its Inquiry into comprehensive 
revision of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 and on 23 April 2014 appeared 
before the Committee for this Inquiry.
Looking ahead
Shortly after the end of the reporting period the 
Government introduced the National Security 
Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 into 
Parliament. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security is examining whether the 
Bill appropriately implements recommendations 
agreed by the Committee in 2013 and is assessing 
the balance of national security and safeguards 
proposed in the Bill. The Bill proposes new powers 
for ASIO and ASIS and other significant changes 
that would increase the scope and complexity  
of oversight arrangements and the workload of 
the OIGIS.
On 5 August 2014, the Prime Minister issued 
a media release about new counter-terrorism 
measures and noted:
These powers will be balanced with proper 
oversight to protect the individual rights of 
Australians, including their right to privacy.  
To ensure this the Government will increase 
the resources of the independent Office of the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.
The principal challenge in 2014–15 will thus be 
to ensure the office develops and maintains the 
technical capability to continue providing effective 
assurance about the legality and propriety of 
intelligence agencies’ extended activities, while 
maintaining the capacity to respond to ministerial 
requests, initiate inquiries, and handle complaints 
as necessary. 
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PART  TWO: PERFORMANCE
Outcomes and programs
The 2013–14 Portfolio Budget Statements provided 
a strategic direction statement with one planned 
outcome for the Office of the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security. That outcome was:
Independent assurance for the Prime Minister, 
senior ministers and Parliament as to whether 
Australia’s intelligence and security agencies 
act legally and with propriety by inspecting, 
inquiring into and reporting on their activities.
The key strategies employed to achieve this 
outcome were:
 u to continue the agency’s inspection activities, 
which involve proactively monitoring and 
reviewing the activities of the intelligence 
agencies
 u where appropriate, to initiate ‘own motion’ 
inquiries and investigate complaints or referrals 
about the activities of the intelligence agencies
 u at the request of the Prime Minister, to inquire 
into an intelligence and security matter of a 
non-intelligence agency.
The single program reflects the small  
size of the agency and the relatively narrow  
focus of its activities.
Program deliverables
The program deliverables include:
 u conducting own motion inquiries as 
appropriate
 u undertaking a comprehensive inspection and 
visits program to monitor and review casework
 u providing effective and timely responses to 
complaints or referrals received from members 
of the public, ministers or Members of 
Parliament
 u undertaking presentations to new and existing 
members of the intelligence agencies to 
ensure an awareness and understanding of 
their responsibilities and accountability
 u liaising with other accountability or integrity 
agencies in Australia and overseas.
Performance indicators
The effectiveness of the office is assessed against 
four key performance indicators. These measures 
take into account the unique role and functions  
of the office as a specialised review body:
 u the breadth and depth of inspection work 
undertaken
7Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14
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 u the timeliness of completion of inquiries or 
complaint resolution
 u the level of acceptance by agencies, 
complainants and ministers of findings and 
recommendations of inquiries conducted
 u the extent to which there has been change 
within the agencies as a result of the activities 
of the office.
Agency engagement
I meet regularly with intelligence agency heads 
and their senior staff to discuss current issues or 
concerns, and to highlight issues arising from our 
inspection and inquiry activities. Agencies typically 
also use these discussions to brief me on emerging 
risks or potential concerns and how they plan to 
respond to these challenges.
These discussions enhance my awareness of each 
intelligence agency’s operational environment and 
also provide a forum to resolve issues informally 
without the need for extended or time consuming 
correspondence where appropriate.
Each agency has also established regular points 
of contact to facilitate our visits and to coordinate 
our various requirements, while within the OIGIS, 
designated officers lead interactions with each 
intelligence agency. The designation of these 
coordination points does not limit my capacity to 
speak with anyone else in the organisation when 
required, and indeed goes a long way to ensuring 
that our requirements are met in a full and prompt 
manner. I would like to express my appreciation to 
our regular points of contact within each agency 
for assisting the work of my office during the 
2013–14 reporting period.
Outreach
Presentations provide an opportunity to explain 
to staff in the intelligence agencies the role 
and functions of the office and to discuss 
matters relating to compliance, professionalism, 
accountability and ethical conduct. In the reporting 
period, we delivered a total of 22 presentations. Of 
these, 13 were to staff in the intelligence agencies, 
including in regional offices and other sites outside 
of Canberra, and nine were to external groups.
We maintained our focus on agency leaders, 
regional operational staff, and officers newly 
appointed to roles with higher compliance 
risk. In response to feedback, we increased our 
discussion of issues identified in recent inquiries 
and remained open to leading presentations 
addressing particular issues as necessary. 
Interaction with staff during these presentations 
remains strong.
I continued the practice of meeting with ASIS 
heads of station and ASIO officers before they 
are posted. This allows me to remind them of the 
OIGIS’s functions and explore specific potential 
challenges raised by conditions at their post.
In the reporting period I was invited to address 
several leadership groups outside the intelligence 
agencies, including the Senior Executive 
Development Program of the Australian National 
University’s National Security College, the 
Attorney-General’s Department ‘Talking Heads’ 
Seminar, and the Australian Cyber Security Centre 
leadership group. In April 2014, I was part of a 
panel at the Law Society of NSW discussing  
Privacy in a Digital Age.
The Assistant Inspector-General, Jake Blight, 
presented once again to the Department of 
Defence Senior Intelligence Managers’ Course, 
and, in August 2013, to the Australian Research 
Council’s Centre of Excellence in Policing  
and Security.
Similar presentations are planned for the  
coming year. 
Inquiries
Under the IGIS Act, the IGIS can conduct a formal 
inquiry into a matter based on a complaint, of the 
IGIS’s own motion, or in response to a ministerial 
request. The Act establishes certain immunities 
and protections and provides for the use of 
strong coercive powers in such inquiries. These 
include the power to compel the production of 
information and documents, to enter premises 
occupied or used by a Commonwealth agency, to 
issue notices to persons to attend before the IGIS 
to answer questions relevant to the matter under 
inquiry, and to administer an oath or affirmation 
when taking evidence.
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provides protections to people who have given 
the OIGIS information. Those compelled to give 
information are protected from any penalty 
under Commonwealth or Territory law that would 
ordinarily arise from disclosing that information.
The responsible minister is advised when the 
IGIS begins an inquiry into a particular agency, 
and is also advised of any conclusions or 
recommendations arising from the inquiry.  
The IGIS also provides opportunities for ministers, 
agency heads and affected individuals to 
comment during the course of an inquiry.
During 2013–14 I completed three inquiries that 
were carried over from the previous reporting 
period. Details of these are set out below. A 
new inquiry was initiated following on from one 
of these inquiries and remained open at the 
end of the reporting period. I will report on my 
conclusions and recommendations from this 
inquiry in my annual report for 2014–15.
Inquiry into the attendance of legal 
representatives at ASIO interviews
The 2012–13 Annual Report noted the progress 
of an inquiry following a complaint alleging ASIO 
officers had made arbitrary decisions regarding 
the attendance of legal representatives at security 
assessment interviews. My preliminary inquiries 
identified some inconsistencies between ASIO 
records and those of the complainant, as well as 
potential communication issues between ASIO 
and Immigration.2 Consequently, I decided to 
initiate an inquiry into the specific complaint,  
and to matters relating to ASIO interviews  
more broadly.
In conducting the inquiry, I considered a range 
of ASIO policy documents and records, including 
records of interviews other than those in the 
original complaint, and interviewed a number  
of ASIO staff. I also obtained statements from 
2 Administrative Arrangement Orders dated 18 September 2013 
transferred the relevant functions of the former Department  
of Immigration and Citizenship to the Department of  
Immigration and Border Protection. This report uses the  
shortened form ‘Immigration’  to refer to both the current  
and former Departments.
several legal representatives who had attended,  
or attempted to attend, ASIO interviews with  
their clients.
I found that ASIO’s internal guidance was both 
sound and appropriate, and does not preclude 
the attendance of legal representatives at ASIO 
interviews. However, ASIO has discretion not to 
interview a person in the presence of a particular 
lawyer if it believes the presence of the lawyer 
would be counterproductive to the conduct 
of the interview. As such, I concluded that the 
attendance of legal representatives should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis, with the 
default position to allow such attendance.
I found that the attitudes of individual officers, 
combined with the process established by 
ASIO and Immigration to arrange interviews, 
strongly discouraged the attendance of legal 
representatives. In addition, ASIO differentiated 
between legal representatives and migration 
agents, precluding migration agents from 
attending interviews altogether.
This inquiry led to a number of recommendations. 
Specifically, ASIO should:
 u work with Immigration to ensure 
arrangements for visa security assessment 
interviews facilitate the attendance of  
legal representatives
 u improve training in, and staff awareness 
of, internal policy relating to the potential 
presence of lawyers at visa security  
assessment interviews
 u clarify the status of any third party wishing to 
attend a visa security assessment interview 
to ascertain if they are the interviewee’s legal 
representative, and further consider affording 
migration agents the same status as lawyers, 
with their attendance being addressed on a 
case-by-case basis
 u improve guidance to officers in relation to 
undertakings of confidentiality.
ASIO agreed to these four recommendations.
I also noted in the report that, in my view, 
visa applicants should be clearly advised that 
interviews with ASIO are voluntary. A fifth 
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recommendation was made to adjust the current 
guidance for staff. This recommendation and 
some supporting text was afforded a national 
security classification by ASIO and cannot be 
publicly released. ASIO agreed, in part, to this 
recommendation.
The inquiry report is classified but a public 
abridged version is available on the IGIS website.3
At the end of the reporting period ASIO provided 
advice about the implementation of the 
recommendations:
 u In March 2014, after consultation between 
ASIO and Immigration, the advice provided 
by Immigration to visa security assessment 
interviewees was revised to state that the 
interviewee is entitled to bring a legal 
representative. 
 u ASIO has updated guidance to staff, 
training and policies relating to visa security 
assessment interviews. In particular, shortly 
after the end of the reporting period ASIO 
finalised a policy on visa security assessment 
interviews. Training and guidance to staff now 
reflect the policy position that visa security 
assessment interviews should commence 
without efforts to discourage the attendance 
of a legal representative.
 u ASIO’s new policy and training requires 
interviewing officers to clarify the role of a 
third party seeking to attend a visa security 
assessment interview to ascertain whether 
they are the interviewee’s legal representative. 
The presence of migration agents at a visa 
security assessment interview is considered  
on a case-by-case basis. 
 u Revised guidance about confidentiality 
undertakings addresses the concerns raised  
in the inquiry. 
Inquiry into the management of  
the case of Mr E
Last year I commenced an inquiry at the then 
Prime Minister’s request into the way that the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP), Immigration 
3 www.igis.gov.au
and ASIO handled the case of a particular 
Egyptian asylum seeker, ’Mr E’, who presented 
complex security issues and, more generally, the 
management by Australian government agencies 
of complex security cases.
The purpose of the inquiry was not to establish 
whether the identified individual posed a threat 
to security but rather to look at whether the 
relevant agencies had, and followed, appropriate 
procedures to identify, assess and manage any 
such threat.
I completed this inquiry and provided the report 
to the Prime Minister in January 2014. The inquiry 
report is classified but a public abridged version is 
available on the IGIS website.4
The inquiry found that, although ASIO held 
information that might have caused it not to clear 
the individual for community detention, ASIO’s 
security assessment processes at that time did not 
include consideration of that information. Different 
areas of ASIO dealt with the potential match to 
alerts connected to the Interpol red notice and the 
community detention checks, and the two areas 
did not communicate effectively with one another.
Immigration lacked awareness of the types of 
security checks ASIO conducted and it is not clear 
that relevant ministers received advice about 
the rigour of the checks. Within ASIO, guidance 
provided to staff was inadequate. Operational staff 
misunderstood the intentions of ASIO’s senior 
executive and the process of checks conducted 
differed from that approved by the ASIO executive.
The inquiry found that Immigration made 
decisions on detention arrangements without a 
full appreciation of all relevant information. The 
AFP gave advice to Immigration over a period 
of time but there was no formal framework for 
such advice. Information held by separate parts 
of Immigration was not shared or interpreted 
consistently. ASIO provided no information to help 
Immigration assess or manage any detention risks.
The inquiry also found deficiencies in 
recordkeeping, particularly in Immigration. 
Key procedures and arrangements between 
4 www.igis.gov.au
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The report made a number of recommendations, 
primarily to Immigration. In summary these were:
 u Immigration and ASIO should continue 
to build on recent improvements in 
implementing a coordinated approach to 
resolving potential matches to national 
security alerts and document agreed 
procedures. 
 u Immigration should develop procedures to 
ensure that the AFP is promptly notified of 
alerts for Interpol red notices. Immigration 
should continue to explore the feasibility of an 
automated system with the AFP. 
 u Immigration should access all relevant 
information in assessing the identity of an 
individual in cases that may involve national 
security issues and formalise arrangements to 
obtain identity resolution advice from the AFP.
 u Immigration should review its procedures 
for conducting risk assessments in cases 
involving national security to ensure that those 
undertaking the assessment have access to 
relevant information and expertise, including 
from ASIO and the AFP.
 u Immigration should ensure proper records are 
retained of a decision to place a person in a 
particular form of immigration detention on 
the basis of security concerns.
 u Immigration and ASIO should ensure that, 
in the small number of cases where there 
are potentially national security issues, all 
relevant information is taken into account 
by Immigration when making immigration 
detention management decisions. 
Significant changes were initiated in ASIO and 
Immigration prior to this case becoming a matter 
of public discussion. By the time this inquiry was 
finished, ASIO and Immigration had introduced 
considerably more robust security checking 
processes prior to community detention or the 
issue of bridging visas, and ASIO had published 
guidance for staff on how to do the checks and 
escalate and resolve concerns. Immigration had 
established a team to identify and oversight 
national security and serious criminality cases.
At the end of the reporting period the agencies 
advised me of their progress on implementing  
the inquiry recommendations.
Immigration advised that coordination and 
collaboration between the Department, ASIO and 
the AFP had improved significantly. I was provided 
with details of actions taken and a copy of the 
Persons of interest placement operational procedures 
document, which guides staff regarding the 
placement of detainees who are of interest to law 
enforcement, intelligence and/or other agencies 
for criminal or national security matters. This 
document was developed in response to the 
inquiry recommendations.
ASIO notes that it continues to advise Immigration 
on significant emerging threat issues through 
providing adverse security assessments and 
discussing impending assessments where this 
would assist Immigration’s decision making on 
detention issues. Where ASIO holds information 
potentially relevant to Immigration’s consideration 
of a person’s overall visa suitability, a qualified visa 
security assessment may be issued. I was provided 
with a procedural document relating to security 
assessments for IMAs for whom Immigration is 
considering the grant or re-grant of a bridging 
visa, or for those being placed in community 
detention. This will provide formal guidance for 
officers in both agencies for handling referrals 
which potentially match national security alerts.
The AFP advised that similar subsequent cases 
have seen the agency implement measures 
addressing the inquiry’s recommendations, 
including case management meetings to facilitate 
complete assessment and sharing of all available 
information among stakeholder agencies.
Overall, all three agencies have made sound 
progress to strengthen communication and 
information-sharing between the agencies. 
Internal policies and procedures have been 
developed and documented to address the 
deficiencies highlighted in the inquiry report. 
Inquiries into the use of weapons and 
self-defence techniques in ASIS 
In April 2013, I commenced an inquiry into the 
use of weapons and self-defence techniques in 
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ASIS. The inquiry was finalised in November 2013. 
The inquiry report is classified but an unclassified 
executive summary is available on the IGIS 
website.5 
The inquiry noted that overall ASIS had managed 
the training in and use of weapons and self-
defence techniques well. Two breaches of the 
ISA occurred between 2004 and mid-2013, both 
involving the discharge of a firearm without 
appropriate prior approval. However, both 
incidents occurred within controlled weapons 
training environments and were not indicative of 
systemic issues. (I note elsewhere in this report 
that in the 2013–14 reporting period there were 
three further, similar breaches of the ISA relating  
to the unauthorised use of a firearm.)
Two main concerns were identified by the 2013 
inquiry. The first was in relation to delays in 
providing oleoresin capsicum spray and batons 
to some overseas Stations after this had been 
approved by the Minister on the basis that the 
weapons were necessary for the safety of staff.  
The inquiry found the delays were due primarily  
to the lack of central governance of weapons 
policy and procedures in ASIS.
The second concern related to the consumption 
of alcohol. ASIS policy at the time required that 
a person with a blood alcohol content above 
zero must not be issued with or have carriage 
of a weapon. The inquiry found some staff 
misunderstanding in relation to this requirement 
and that ASIS did not have adequate controls 
in place to provide assurance that there was 
compliance with this requirement.
Six recommendations were made as a result of 
the inquiry, most relating to the governance of 
weapons policy and procedures in ASIS. ASIS 
accepted all the recommendations and by the 
end of the reporting period most had been 
implemented. A number of the recommendations 
were waiting on the release of revised ASIS 
Guidelines for the use of weapons and self-
defence techniques to be fully implemented. The 
most significant of these guidelines are in relation 
to the consumption of alcohol and controls to 
5 www.igis.gov.au
ensure compliance. Shortly after the end of the 
reporting period revised Guidelines covering these 
issues were implemented.
In December 2013 a further more serious 
incident occurred overseas involving an allegedly 
inappropriate action by an officer of another 
Australian government agency towards an 
ASIS officer. A review of the incident confirmed 
that ASIS did not yet have adequate controls in 
place to provide assurance that a person with 
a blood alcohol content above zero would not 
be issued with or have carriage of a weapon. 
While no physical injury resulted, the incident 
had the potential to cause serious injury. ASIS’s 
investigation of the incident highlighted systemic 
issues. I was advised by the Director-General  
of ASIS that the investigation also revealed 
that there were inaccuracies in the information 
provided to me during the course of my 2013 
inquiry. My review of the ASIS investigation  
report and interviews indicated other  
substantial discrepancies.
In June 2014, I initiated a further inquiry into the 
management of weapons by ASIS in that particular 
location to examine these issues and related 
matters and to review the findings of my 2013 
inquiry report. Further details of the inquiry will  
be included in my 2014–15 annual report.
Complaints and contacts
Complaints can be made orally or in writing on 
matters that relate to the legality and propriety of 
actions of an intelligence agency.
Each contact made to my office is assessed to 
determine whether it falls within the functions 
of my office and what is the most appropriate 
course of action. Where it is assessed that a 
complaint justifies further action, it will be handled 
administratively in the first instance. Since the 
introduction of the PID scheme, contacts are also 
assessed to determine whether they should be 
handled under that scheme.
In most cases complaints and other matters can 
be resolved quite quickly and efficiently by IGIS 
staff speaking to the relevant agency or looking at 
their records. This approach can resolve whether a 
particular matter is within jurisdiction and reduces 
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discussion with an agency or a check of records 
can resolve the matter. Administrative resolution 
can allow for a timely response to be provided to 
the complainant. Information provided by agencies 
in this way can help decide whether to pursue an 
inquiry for more serious or complex matters.
Notwithstanding how a matter is handled, all 
persons contacting my office are advised of the 
actions of my office, and the outcomes, to the 
extent possible.
Complaints about security assessments 
for visa applicants
ASIO provides Commonwealth agencies with 
security assessments relevant to their functions and 
responsibilities. A visa application to travel to, or 
remain in, Australia may be referred to ASIO with a 
request to provide a security assessment. My office 
does not assess the merits of any particular security 
assessment, nor do we request a change in the 
priority of processing of cases, or request that any 
particular case be expedited. However, where visa 
applicants have reasonable concerns that an error 
may have occurred, we examine ASIO’s processes.
During 2013–14 we increased our focus on ASIO’s 
handling of visa security assessments because of the 
significant impact this can have on individuals. This 
increased focus was achieved through obtaining 
direct access to ASIO’s systems as well as increased 
liaison with other government stakeholders including 
Immigration and the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
In cases where the visa application was lodged more 
than 12 months previously, we examined ASIO’s 
systems to determine whether or not the applicant 
had been referred to ASIO for a security assessment 
and, if so, reviewed ASIO’s handling of the matter. 
In each case, we looked at whether ASIO had acted 
unreasonably or had made a processing error.
My office does not ordinarily advise complainants 
that they have or have not been the subject of a 
security assessment by ASIO, unless this has already 
been confirmed to them by Immigration, or where 
we have found a significant issue of concern involving 
ASIO which would justify this office doing so. Where 
I am satisfied that there is no evidence of error by 
ASIO, my staff will advise complainants of that. While 
we identify few errors, where we do find ASIO has 
made an error, we request that the organisation 
rectify the matter. Where we find that no referral 
has been made, or that one has been made and 
finalised, my staff advise the complainant that there 
is currently no referral with ASIO. We are unable to 
provide complainants with specific information but 
indicate three possible explanations: there has been 
no referral, there has been a referral and it was not 
required, or there has been a referral and it has  
been finalised.
ASIO visa security assessment processes
During the reporting period we initiated a new process for investigating visa security 
assessment complaints. IGIS staff now interrogate ASIO’s systems directly for information 
relating to particular visa security assessments. This process has proven to be an effective 
way of integrating our complaint and inspection activities. As a result of this new process we 
identified progress had stalled for up to six months in a small number of visa assessments 
because they had not been reassigned following the departure of staff from the visa security 
assessments team. We raised this issue with ASIO, which subsequently reviewed and formalised 
procedures relating to the allocation of cases in accordance with priorities set by Immigration, 
and national security considerations. 
During the reporting period we have noted improvements in systems, processes and 
recordkeeping within ASIO. For example, case officers are recording more detailed case notes 
and reasons for changes in priority and case assignment. My staff can also request information 
from Immigration, which has proven useful in verifying claims.
Despite the issues we identified, overall I am satisfied that ASIO visa security assessment 
processes have been appropriate.
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Commonwealth Ombudsman
The work of this office complements the work 
of the Commonwealth Ombudsman who has 
jurisdiction to investigate matters relating to 
Immigration. During the reporting period my staff 
increased engagement with their counterparts in 
the office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. 
This engagement led to discussions of future 
collaboration and improvements in the flow of 
information between the two offices. We also 
refreshed our memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) with the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
and revised our online complaints form to allow 
complainants to consent to the direct transfer  
of complaints where appropriate. 
Referrals from the Australian Human 
Rights Commission 
The Australian Human Rights Commission is 
required to refer to the IGIS human rights and 
discrimination matters relating to an act or 
practice of intelligence and security agencies.  
In this reporting period the AHRC referred one 
case concerning ASIO delay in processing  
security assessments for immigration purposes. 
Our investigation revealed the individual 
concerned had not been referred to ASIO  
for a security assessment.
Other complaints (non visa-related)
The OIGIS registers as a complaint any approach 
from a member of the public that involves a 
credible allegation about illegality or impropriety 
in relation to an action by an intelligence agency. 
That is, there is a reasonable basis for the person 
believing that an intelligence agency or one of its 
employees has done something wrong.
I received seventeen non visa-related complaints 
in the reporting period. Thirteen complaints were 
about ASIO, while two related to ASIS and two 
to DSD. All seventeen complaints were resolved 
administratively. 
Employment-related matters
The IGIS Act (ss. 8(5) and 8(7)) limits the capacity 
of the IGIS to investigate what might be regarded 
as individual employment-related grievances 
within the six intelligence agencies – essentially 
those relating to promotion, transfer or reduction, 
termination, discipline, remuneration or other terms 
and conditions of service.
When a complaint to the office relates to this type 
of grievance, our usual practice is to refer the matter, 
at least in the first instance, back to the agency 
concerned to be addressed through its internal 
grievance mechanisms or through procedures for 
reporting alleged breaches of the relevant Code of 
Conduct (where this is applicable).
The Code of Conduct provisions under the Public 
Service Act 1999 apply to employees of DIGO, DIO, 
DSD and ONA, while similar arrangements are 
separately established by determinations made 
under the ASIO Act and the ISA for employees of 
ASIO and ASIS respectively.
Seven of the seventeen non visa-related complaints 
(41%) were from current or former employees or 
agents of intelligence agencies — five were ASIO 
employees and two worked for ASIS. Complaint 
issues included the impending loss of a security 
clearance and consequent loss of employment, 
workplace culture, and failure to meet contractual 
obligations. In each case, we examined agency 
records and met with key personnel. 
Investigations into payment of entitlements by ASIS
Two complaints about ASIS were from individuals whose arrangements with ASIS had been 
terminated. In both cases the individuals believed they had suffered detriment caused by ASIS, 
including financial detriment because entitlements had not been paid. After reviewing ASIS’s 
records — some stretching over many years — I was satisfied there was no evidence ASIS had 
not fulfilled its obligations and that the matters did not warrant further inquiry. These cases 
demonstrate the value of detailed and accurate records in resolving such claims.
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about the conduct of an intelligence agency that 
was affecting the complainants’ employment in 
sensitive roles outside the intelligence agencies. 
Four of these concerned ASIO delay in finalising 
security assessments for Aviation Security 
Identification Cards (ASIC) or Maritime Security 
Identification Cards (MSIC). These cards are issued 
by the Department of Infrastructure to identify 
persons who have met the minimum security 
requirements to work unescorted or unmonitored 
in a maritime or aviation security zone. A 
background check is undertaken by AusCheck,  
a unit of the Attorney-General’s Department,  
and includes checks by ASIO.
The four complaints received about such delays 
represent a very small fraction (0.002%) of ASIO’s 
annual workload of ASIC and MSIC security 
assessments, and I am generally satisfied with 
ASIO’s processing arrangements.
I have undertaken to continue to monitor the 
progress of complex MSIC and ASIC cases.
Other contacts with the office
We were also contacted by over 200 individuals 
who were seeking advice or expressing concern 
about matters affecting them that were assessed 
to be outside the jurisdiction of my office, or as 
lacking credibility.
In response, we provided written or verbal advice 
about the jurisdiction of the office and alternative 
avenues to pursue, including other complaint-
handling bodies, the police and the National 
Security Hotline. In cases where there had been 
previous contact with my office about matters  
that had already been assessed, we took no  
further action.
Statistics on inquiries and complaint matters  
raised with my office can be found at Annex 1.
Public Interest Disclosure scheme
As mentioned earlier, the PID Act commenced 
on 15 January 2014. OIGIS has received a number 
of enquiries concerning the PID scheme, but by 
30 June 2014 had received only one disclosure 
directly that fell within the scheme’s parameters. 
This disclosure was made in April 2014 by a 
former intelligence agency employee who raised 
concerns about an officer in another Australian 
government agency. In this case, the OIGIS  
referred the matter to the agency in question  
for investigation.
OIGIS has been formally advised that six PID 
cases have been raised and allocated across the 
six intelligence agencies. Investigations were 
completed in four of these before the end of 
the reporting year 2013–14. Cases have mostly 
involved a range of personnel management 
matters. One case involved administrative 
deficiencies in the procurement of external 
services, and the agency concerned has advised 
that investigation of this disclosure identified 
useful refinements to administrative processes.
IGIS role in Freedom of 
Information and Archives matters 
The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) sets 
out various exemptions to the requirement for 
government agencies to provide documents. One 
of the exemptions applies to documents affecting 
national security, defence or international relations. 
Before deciding that a document is not exempt 
under this provision the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT) and the Information Commissioner 
are required to seek evidence from the IGIS. There 
are equivalent provisions in the Archives Act 1983 
for the AAT.
In this reporting period I was called on twice by 
the Information Commissioner to give evidence in 
FOI matters. In one case I decided that the matter 
fell outside of my area of expertise and, on that 
basis, I declined to give evidence. In the other case 
I provided evidence on one aspect of the claim 
being made by the Commonwealth.
I was notified by the AAT of two new Archives 
cases where I may be required to give evidence. 
One case was carried over from the previous 
reporting period. In each of these three cases 
I undertook the lengthy process of examining 
documents and preparing evidence. In two of 
the cases I was ultimately not required to give 
evidence. In the other case, Fernandes and  
National Archives of Australia [2014] AATA 180  
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(2 April 2014), I gave evidence about a number of 
documents. The Tribunal decided that two parts of 
one contested document could be released; that 
decision has been appealed to the Federal Court.
The number of cases referred to me by the 
Information Commissioner and the AAT is similar 
to the previous reporting period; however, the size 
and complexity of the AAT cases meant that more 
office resources were devoted to the preparation 
of evidence in 2013–14. 
Numbers and trends
Inquiries
During the reporting period, three inquiries 
that had been carried over were concluded and 
one inquiry was initiated. This compares to five 
inquiries initiated in 2012–13.6 
Complaints
As noted above, we consider a matter to be a 
‘complaint’ if it concerns a credible allegation 
about illegality or impropriety in relation to an 
action of an intelligence agency.
With approaches to the office about non visa-
related matters, a straightforward judgement 
is normally sufficient to determine whether or 
not the issues raised reach the threshold to be 
considered as a complaint.
For approaches about visa-related security 
assessments, we also consider the length of 
time ASIO has had to respond to a request for a 
security assessment before determining whether 
the matter should be treated as a complaint 
or a contact. Specifically, we consider whether 
the visa application was submitted more than 
twelve months earlier or, where an individual has 
previously approached the office, whether six 
months have passed since previous inquiries were 
made. Approaches about visa-related security 
6 The IGIS 2012–13 Annual Report counted complaints resolved 
through making inquiries of an agency head but without the use 
of any formal powers as a ‘preliminary inquiry’. This is a potentially 
misleading use of the word ‘inquiry’ — which in the IGIS Act 
is reserved for Division 3 inquiries. These complaints are now 
included in statistics as complaints handled administratively.
assessments that do not meet these criteria are 
described as ‘contacts’ (see below).
In 2013–14, IGIS received a total of 504 complaints, 
of which 487 were about visa-related security 
assessments and 17 were non visa-related (see  
also Annex 1 Table1.2).
In 2012–13, IGIS received a total of 375 complaints, 
of which 361 were about visa-related security 
assessments and 14 concerned non visa-related 
matters.
In 2011–12 we received a total of 439 complaints 
comprising 430 complaints about visa-related 
security assessments, and 9 non visa-related 
matters that were treated as complaints.
Complaints about security assessments 
for visa applicants
The 487 visa security assessment related 
complaints received in 2013–14 came from a wide 
variety of individuals. The following table shows 
a breakdown of visa complaints actioned by my 
office, by visa type.
2013–14 Complaints by visa type
Visa type Number Percentage
Study 1 0.2
Refugee & 
humanitarian
12 2.5
IMA 46 9.5
Family 101 20.8
Skilled, business  
and work
327 67.0
The largest number of complaints came from 
individuals seeking skilled business and work visas, 
or family reunion visas. Complaints from irregular 
maritime arrivals (IMAs) comprised 9.5 per cent of 
complaints actioned by my office.
Visa-related security assessment complaints have 
consistently represented 96–98 per cent of all 
complaints made to IGIS since 2011-12.
The number of complaints about visa-related 
security assessments has varied but the sample 
size is small and the number of complaints can 
depend on unpredictable external factors. If a few 
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to our office this will cause a surge in the number of 
recorded complaints. And changes in the intake of 
irregular arrivals in one year may affect the number 
of complaints to our office 12 months later.
No readily discernible factors drove the increased 
number of visa-related security assessment 
complaints to my office in 2013–14 compared to 
the previous reporting period, and I do not regard 
the year-on-year increase as being statistically 
relevant or a cause for undue concern.
Although the majority of complaints to our office 
concern visa-related security assessments, we 
spend more time per complaint processing non 
visa-related complaints. This is because visa-related 
security assessments are predominantly focused 
on issues of timeliness, while other complaints 
to our office can and do cover the full range 
of agency activities which may require more 
extensive investigation. 
Despite this, during the 2013–14 reporting period 
my office made a number of refinements to our 
inspection activities in regards to visa security 
assessment complaints, with a view to improving 
our understanding of the visa application process 
at both Immigration and ASIO and focusing on 
areas of potential concern based on any trends 
which emerge from our complaints-handling 
function.
Other complaints (non visa-related)
I received 17 non visa-related complaints in 
the reporting period. This is comparable to the 
14 complaints received in 2012–13. Thirteen 
complaints in this reporting period were about 
ASIO, while two related to ASIS and two to DSD.  
All 17 complaints were resolved administratively. 
Contacts
In addition to dealing with complaints, we also 
respond to people who raise issues we regard  
as ‘contacts’ rather than complaints. 
These contacts are approaches made to the 
IGIS which fall outside of the jurisdiction of the 
office, fall outside of the timelines described 
above for visa-related security assessments, or 
do not raise serious and credible concerns about 
the intelligence agencies. Contacts are handled 
administratively rather than by means of inquiry  
or investigation.
Although we maintain a record of all persons 
who contact our office, figures for the number 
of contacts we receive are inexact as not all 
contacts by all persons are recorded due to the 
administrative burden involved in doing so (for 
example, some individuals send repeated emails or 
faxes, or make repeated phone calls to the office).
We received contacts from approximately 200 
individuals during the reporting period, all of 
which we responded to administratively. This 
is similar to the number of individuals who 
contacted our office in the previous two reporting 
periods. No obvious trends are discernible from 
this data other than that a number of individuals 
continue to seek reassurance that they are not 
being targeted by the intelligence community.
Public interest disclosures 
As noted above, one PID disclosure was directly 
received and handled in the reporting period. 
Six PID complaints were notified to the office as 
having been received by the intelligence agencies.
Timeliness
Three inquiries were completed during the year. 
The complexity of the subject matter and the 
individual circumstances of each inquiry were 
factors affecting timeliness. The duration of these 
inquiries ranged from 228 days for an inquiry  
into ASIS’s use of weapons, to 280 days for an 
inquiry into the actions and interactions of three 
Commonwealth agencies in the management  
of an irregular maritime arrival case (see Annex 1 
Table 1.1).
The IGIS Act has prescriptive and comprehensive 
procedural fairness requirements allowing 
individuals, agency heads and ministers the 
opportunity to comment on or discuss a report’s 
findings before the report is finalised. This can 
add some months to an inquiry. For example, 
the inquiry into the management of the case of 
the Egyptian IMA involving ASIO, the AFP and 
Immigration commenced in June 2013, initial 
documents were obtained in July, interviews 
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were largely conducted in August, the report 
was largely drafted in September and preliminary 
views provided to agency heads in early October. 
Following consideration of further submissions 
and additional documents that were provided, the 
proposed report was provided to ministers at the 
end of November inviting them to meet to discuss 
the report. Following these meetings the final 
report was provided to the Prime Minister at the 
end of January.
Complaints of all types were assessed promptly 
and initial responses were made within two weeks 
of receipt in all cases, with the average time taken 
to acknowledge a complaint being two days. Of 
complaints about visa security assessments that 
were handled administratively, 88.5 per cent were 
completed within two weeks of the complaint 
being received, with the average time taken 
being nine days. For other complaints, 35 per 
cent were completed within two weeks of the 
complaint being received, with the average time 
taken being 55 days. These variations in timeliness 
reflect differences in the nature of the complaint, 
with common themes arising in many complaints 
about visa security assessments compared to  
the diversity of complex issues that can arise in 
other complaints.
Effecting change in agencies
Where an inquiry makes recommendations, we 
ask agencies to indicate whether they accept 
these recommendations. Where appropriate, we 
also follow up at the end of the reporting period 
the progress of outstanding recommendations, 
including those from previous years. I am pleased 
with the agencies’ high level of acceptance 
Implementation of recommendations — Analytic independence inquiry of 2012–13
In 2012–13, I conducted an inquiry into the analytic independence of the assessment activities 
of ASIO, DIO and ONA. While there was no evidence of inappropriate pressure being placed 
on any of the agencies, the inquiry recommended a number of improvements to policies, 
procedures and training in ASIO and DIO so that those agencies could consistently demonstrate 
their assessments are free from interference or bias.
That inquiry recommended DIO and ASIO implement policies to improve the consistency of 
referencing and recordkeeping in regard to analytical product. The review also identified that 
ASIO and DIO did not conduct formal reviews of key judgments to see whether there were 
any lessons that could be learnt from previous analytic work and did not have written policies 
relating to the management of dissent.
In early 2014, I conducted a review of DIO’s implementation of the inquiry’s recommendations. 
This review found that DIO has implemented new policies regarding referencing and 
recordkeeping. My staff inspected a large sample of DIO’s analytic product issued in 2013–14 
and found substantial improvements in the use and quality of references. This review also 
found improvements in the consistency of recordkeeping in product development. 
DIO is developing a new intelligence production IT system. Technical problems with the 
new system have required DIO to delay its introduction until later in 2014. We have looked 
at the initial functionality of this system and agree with DIO that it is likely to make a sound 
contribution to further improving DIO’s referencing and recordkeeping. 
This review also found DIO had implemented new policies regarding key judgment reviews 
and dissent management. OIGIS staff attended a key judgments review session and found the 
process productive and robust. DIO had not experienced a major case of dissent under the new 
dissent management policy, but this review found the policy was likely to be effective.
In mid-2014, I initiated a similar review of ASIO’s implementation of the 2012 inquiry’s 
recommendations. This review is expected to be completed by late 2014.
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The actions taken by the agencies in respect 
of inquiries completed in the reporting period 
are described further in the section on inquiries 
commencing on page 7.
Our inspection and complaint activities also 
provide opportunities for the office to effect 
change in the intelligence agencies. Any issues 
that we identify through inspections and 
complaints are raised with the agency concerned 
and, as a result, we have seen a number of 
changes in agency processes. Some of these 
changes are described in our highlight stories  
and elsewhere in this report.
Inspections
Overview of inspection activities 
The office regularly examines selected agency 
records to ensure that the activities of the 
intelligence agencies comply with the relevant 
legislative and policy frameworks and to  
identify issues before there is a need for  
major remedial action.
These inspections largely focus on the activities 
of ASIO, ASIS, DIGO and DSD given each of these 
agencies has access to intrusive powers and 
investigative techniques.
During 2013–14, inspection teams responsible for 
oversighting ASIO, ASIS, DIGO and DSD continued 
to coordinate closely to identify areas of high 
compliance risk. Inspection activities focused on 
the management of joint ministerial authorisations 
made under the ISA, special powers warrants 
issued to ASIO, information sharing between 
agencies, systems for communicating information 
requests between agencies, and recordkeeping.
Inspection activities relating to DIO and ONA 
are generally limited to ensuring that their 
assessments comply with administrative privacy 
guidelines (which have a similar effect to the 
privacy rules applying to ASIS, DSD and DIGO).
Inspection activities consider whether or not  
each agency is acting in accordance with its 
statutory functions, any guidance provided by  
the responsible minister, and its own internal 
policies and procedures.
In the reporting period the relatively high inquiry 
workload resulted in prioritisation of inspections 
work based on a risk management approach. The 
oversight of ASIO, ASIS and DSD was maintained 
but fewer resources were allocated to DIGO, DIO 
and ONA. 
Inspection of ASIO activities
The ASIO Act empowers ASIO to obtain, correlate 
and evaluate intelligence information relevant 
to security. ASIO’s activities are governed by 
the ASIO Act as well as the Attorney-General’s 
Guidelines and internal policies and procedures. 
The Attorney-General’s Guidelines require that any 
means used by ASIO to obtain information must 
be proportionate to the gravity of the threat and 
the probability of its occurrence, and inquiries 
and investigations into individuals or groups 
should be undertaken using as little intrusion into 
individual privacy as is possible consistent with 
the performance of ASIO’s functions. Where such 
intrusions are unavoidable, the distribution of any 
information obtained should be limited to persons 
or agencies with a demonstrable ‘need to know’.
Human source management
This inspection activity focuses on ensuring the 
management of ASIO human source operations is 
both legal and proper. While the details of these 
inspections are sensitive and cannot be disclosed 
in a public report, we noted that there was 
considerable improvement in both recordkeeping 
and compliance with internal ASIO guidelines 
during 2013–14 in relation to the management  
of human sources.
Review of submissions to the  
Attorney-General
Each quarter my office reviews a range of 
submissions made by ASIO to the Attorney-
General on operational matters. In addition to the 
other ASIO inspection activities, these reviews are 
proving useful in obtaining an overview of legality 
and propriety issues relevant to high risk activities.
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Regular inspection of investigative cases
Each month my staff review a sample of ASIO 
investigative cases to examine:
 u the justification and objectives provided for 
the investigation
 u whether the investigative activities that were 
undertaken or proposed were appropriate
 u whether investigations were subject to formal 
approval and periodic review
 u the application of the principle of 
proportionality (using less intrusive methods 
where possible and only progressing to more 
intrusive methods as required)
 u compliance with internal policies and 
procedures.
Our sample selection is oriented to those cases 
utilising more intrusive investigative methods — 
for example, cases with warrants approved by 
the Attorney-General, access to sensitive financial 
information or prospective data authorisations. 
During the reporting period my office sought 
advice from ASIO on the adequacy of their 
internal approval procedures for accessing 
sensitive information from government and non-
government agencies. ASIO has advised this issue 
will be considered in a comprehensive review of 
their policies and procedures which has recently 
commenced, and I will be monitoring its progress 
in this regard.
In one case it was noted that ASIO had provided 
assistance to a law enforcement agency in 
response to a request, although that request had 
not been made by the head of that agency as 
required under section 19A(2) of the ASIO Act.
Another ongoing focus of my inspections has 
been to ensure a high standard of recordkeeping 
and decision making is maintained, particularly 
that appropriate guidance is provided by 
authorising officers to more junior staff.
My staff continue to work with ASIO to ensure 
that the inspection process can provide direct and 
meaningful feedback to ASIO investigative staff in 
a timely manner.
ASIO warrants
ASIO can intercept telecommunications and use 
other intrusive powers following the issue of 
warrants by the Attorney-General. The authority 
for telecommunications intercepts is provided by 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 (TIA Act). The ASIO Act authorises other 
powers including the use of listening devices, 
searches and computer access.
In 2013–14 we reviewed approximately half of 
the warrants obtained by ASIO. These inspections 
occur after the Attorney-General has authorised 
the warrant and usually after ASIO has completed 
the operation and reported back to the Attorney-
General.
During 2013–14 our inspection program identified 
four errors in ASIO’s execution of warrant powers, 
each of which constituted a breach of either the 
ASIO Act or the TIA Act. I also identified a very 
small number of minor administrative errors, 
including typographical errors. In all these cases 
I was satisfied that these administrative errors 
did not impact on the legality or propriety of the 
warrant, and that appropriate remedial actions 
were taken.
 u My office identified one breach under the  
ASIO Act relating to delay by ASIO in revoking 
a warrant. The ASIO Act requires ASIO to inform 
the minister ‘forthwith’ once the grounds 
on which the warrant was issued cease to 
exist. For the warrant in question there was a 
considerable delay in providing the relevant 
notification to the Attorney-General. ASIO 
consulted us about an appropriate timeframe 
for notifying the Attorney-General, and a new 
policy was developed to ensure ASIO meets its 
legislative obligation.
 u Three breaches under the TIA Act were 
identified by my office across the reporting 
period. Two of these incidents were not 
within ASIO’s control but were the result of 
information from a carrier which later proved 
to be incorrect. The third incident involved 
ASIO’s failure to comply with section 17 of  
the TIA Act to address the usefulness of 
warrant activity in a formal report to the 
Attorney-General. 
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the reporting period. In addition to the breaches 
identified by my office, ASIO reported three 
breaches of the TIA Act, and two breaches of the 
ASIO Act.
 u In the first breach of the TIA Act, ASIO 
intercepted, without warrant, calls made 
from one of its own regional offices due to 
a technical error. The data was deleted and 
processes put in place to ensure it does not 
happen again.
 u The second breach of the TIA Act occurred 
when a notice to cease collection sent 
to a telecommunications provider was 
mis-recorded by the provider and was 
subsequently renewed. ASIO identified the 
error within 24 hours and quarantined and 
deleted the data before it could be accessed 
by staff.
 u The third breach of the TIA Act reported by 
ASIO dates back to the previous reporting 
period, and involved the malfunctioning of 
a telecommunications provider’s equipment 
which resulted in non-warranted data being 
forwarded to ASIO systems. Once the error  
was identified, ASIO removed all non-
warranted data from its systems.
 u In the first breach of the ASIO Act, ASIO 
reported that an incorrectly configured device 
collected data that was not covered by a 
warrant over a period of several months.  
All non-warranted data was deleted.
 u The second breach of the ASIO Act occurred 
due to an internal administrative error when 
collection of a listening device continued 
for seven days after the warrant was revoked 
by the Attorney-General. None of the non-
warranted data was accessed by ASIO staff, 
and the data was subsequently removed  
from ASIO’s systems.
While I am generally satisfied by the overall 
manner in which warrants are processed I  
did identify some additional issues which  
merit comment.
As noted in previous annual reports, I have a 
particular interest in ASIO’s use of B-Party warrants 
because of the potential for intrusive collection of 
material that is not relevant to security. In 2013–14 
there was a modest increase in the use of such 
warrants following a decrease the previous year. 
This increase was due to a growth in the number 
of Australians involved in foreign conflicts. Most 
of these warrants are reviewed by my office. I am 
currently consulting with the Attorney-General’s 
Department about ASIO’s interpretation of the 
provisions in the TIA that restrict the availability  
of B-party warrants.
During the reporting period my staff were 
briefed on ASIO’s management of the process of 
providing a formal report to the Attorney-General 
on warrants, a requirement under both the ASIO 
Act and the TIA Act. The reporting regime is 
generally quite robust, with a number of internal 
and external oversight mechanisms operating 
to ensure ASIO complies with its legislative 
requirements. One area identified for additional 
focus is the consistency and accuracy of reporting 
over long-running warrants that are periodically 
renewed. It is my intention to conduct a ‘whole 
of life’ review of a number of long-running and 
complex warrants and I expect to be able to report 
on this activity in the next reporting period.
Questioning and detention warrants
No questioning, or questioning and detention 
warrants were sought by, or issued to, ASIO  
during the reporting period.
ASIO access to telecommunications 
locational information or subscriber data
The TIA Act provides the legal authority for a 
nominated group of ASIO senior managers 
to authorise collection of prospective and 
historical telecommunications data from 
telecommunications carriers or carriage service 
providers. Prospective data authorisations 
provide near real-time location and other 
subscriber information for the period that an 
authorisation is in force. The threshold that 
ASIO is required to meet is that access to the 
data is in connection with the performance by 
ASIO of its functions. In addition, the Attorney-
General’s Guidelines state that investigative 
activities should use as little intrusion into 
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personal privacy as is possible, consistent with 
the performance of ASIO’s functions. A request 
for access to telecommunications data should 
only be submitted once less intrusive methods 
have been attempted, or considered and found 
to be insufficient. Similarly, the Attorney-General’s 
Guidelines state that authorisation levels for 
activities should be higher for more intrusive 
investigative techniques.
ASIO’s access to prospective telecommunications 
data is reviewed as part of our regular inspection 
program. Due to their intrusive nature, access to 
prospective and historical telecommunications 
data are reviewed in a similar manner to 
telecommunications warrants.
I did not identify any concerns with ASIO’s access 
to prospective and historic telecommunications 
data. My office’s oversight of this particular 
investigative technique decreased during this 
reporting period due primarily to changes in 
our inspection program and the high rate of 
compliance in this area.
I am satisfied that prospective data authorisations 
reviewed were endorsed by an appropriate senior 
officer, and that ASIO has regard to the Attorney-
General’s Guidelines and is meeting the legislative 
requirement to only make requests for data in 
connection with the performance of its functions.
Preservation requests
The Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act 2012 
came into effect in late 2012. This Act amended 
the TIA Act to provide a new power for ASIO 
and law enforcement agencies to give notice to 
telecommunications carriers to require them to 
retain certain stored communications for up to  
90 days while ASIO seeks an appropriate warrant 
to access those communications. These notices  
are called Preservation Notices.
While the new legislation refers to both domestic 
and foreign preservation notices, only domestic 
notices are relevant to ASIO. These notices 
can only be used where they ‘might assist the 
Organisation in carrying out its functions of 
obtaining intelligence relating to security’.
Section 158A of the TIA Act specifically provides 
that the IGIS has functions in relation to providing 
assurance of compliance by ASIO in respect of 
preservation notices.
Throughout the reporting period there was a 
very small number of such notices raised by ASIO. 
These activities were reviewed as part of our 
ongoing inspection program and there were  
no issues of concern identified in relation to  
those reviewed.
Access to taxation information
The Taxation Administration Act 1953 (s.355-
70; Schedule 1) provides for a taxation officer 
authorised by the Commissioner of Taxation or 
delegate to disclose protected information to 
an authorised ASIO officer if the information is 
relevant to the performance of ASIO’s functions.
This access to sensitive information is further 
governed by an MOU between the Commissioner 
of Taxation and the Director-General of Security, 
the Attorney-General’s Guidelines and ASIO’s 
internal guidelines and procedures, ensuring that a 
request for taxation information can only be made 
when less intrusive means have been exhausted 
and not yielded the required information.
ASIO rarely requests access to this type of 
information. My office reviews all of ASIO’s access 
to sensitive financial information, including:
 u ASIO requests for information from the ATO
 u spontaneous disseminations from the  
ATO to ASIO
 u disseminations of information from ASIO to  
a law enforcement agency.
ASIO reported that no requests had been made  
to access ATO information in 2013–14.
Exchange of information with  
foreign liaisons
The ASIO Act provides the authority for ASIO to 
seek information from, and provide information 
to, authorities in other countries that is relevant to 
Australia’s security, or the security of the foreign 
country. ASIO may only cooperate with foreign 
authorities approved by the Attorney-General. In 
general, the types of foreign authorities approved 
by the Attorney-General perform broadly 
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and intelligence authorities, law enforcement, 
immigration and border control, and government 
coordination bodies.
ASIO has internal guidelines that govern the 
communication of information on Australians and 
foreign nationals to approved foreign authorities. 
These guidelines impose an internal framework 
for assessing and approving the passage of 
such information. ASIO’s internal requirements 
vary according to the country, based on factors 
such as ASIO’s previous experience dealing with 
their authorities and how the foreign authorities 
manage information received, including in relation 
to human rights issues.
During 2013–14, my office inspected a sample of 
authorisation documentation and correspondence 
for such exchanges, both through regular reviews 
of ASIO investigative cases and through dedicated 
foreign liaison inspection activities.
My office identified one instance when ASIO 
communicated information on Australian persons 
to a non-approved foreign authority responsible 
for issuing passports for that country. The case 
raised complex legal issues and at the end of the 
reporting period I had not formed a final view on 
whether approval from the Attorney-General was 
strictly legally required; however, my view is that at 
least as a matter of propriety and compliance with 
the intention of the restrictions the matter should 
have gone to the Attorney-General.
Inspections by my office have also identified  
cases where ASIO could improve compliance  
with internal guidelines, particularly in relation  
to documenting human rights considerations.  
I continue to raise these matters with ASIO.
Access to ASIO’s information holdings by staff 
Our inspection program includes the regular review of investigative authorities generated by 
ASIO for its own internal security purposes.
In one case I questioned whether the justification given for the internal security investigation 
was sufficient or reasonable, having regard to all of the circumstances. In particular I questioned 
whether it was appropriate for personal information about a member of the public to be passed 
to an ASIO officer who had expressed concerns that the individual might pose a risk to the 
officer’s own personal safety. 
I was advised at the time that all ASIO staff members could access some ASIO holdings to 
perform checks on individuals, including neighbours and social contacts that might relate to 
personal security or safety. I expressed concern that ASIO did not have formal processes in 
place to ensure that personal information in ASIO’s holdings about a member of the public 
could not be released to a staff member or accessed directly by the staff member. In my view, 
this is out of step with community expectations in respect of privacy.
In response to the concerns I raised, in June 2014 ASIO implemented a new security policy for 
the use of information holdings within ASIO. The policy emphasises that information holdings 
within ASIO are only for official purposes and that ASIO staff are not to access ASIO information 
holdings to obtain information which may be relevant to their personal circumstances. Staff 
with security concerns should raise this with the relevant area within ASIO, which will conduct 
the necessary checks.
In my view this is a significant improvement in privacy protection that occurred as a result of 
concerns raised by this office. I will be monitoring the implementation of this new policy and 
have requested that ASIO provide details of any post-implementation audits.
23Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14
 PA
R
T TW
O
 / PERFO
RM
A
N
C
E
Inspection of agencies subject to  
the Intelligence Services Act 2001 
Limits on intelligence agencies’ 
functions 
There was media interest in the reporting period 
about the extent to which the OIGIS could 
effectively assess whether intelligence agencies 
act within their functions or otherwise undertake 
what could generally be regarded as commercial 
espionage. 
The functions of the ISA agencies are set out in 
sections 6, 6B and 7 of the ISA. For example, for 
ASIS the most relevant functions are to obtain in 
accordance with the Government’s requirements, 
intelligence about the capabilities, intentions 
of activities of people or organisations outside 
Australia; and to communicate in accordance with 
the Government’s requirements, such intelligence. 
The work of ASIS, DSD and DIGO is guided by the 
national intelligence priorities, which are reviewed 
and agreed by the National Security Committee  
of Cabinet each year. 
The ISA also requires that ASIS, DSD and DIGO 
only perform their functions in the interests of 
Australia’s national security, Australia’s foreign 
relations or Australia’s national economic  
well-being and only to the extent that those 
matters are affected by the capabilities,  
intentions or activities of people or  
organisations outside Australia. 
While I do not conduct particular inspections to 
determine whether agencies’ activities comply 
with the limits of their functions, we are always 
mindful of this fundamental question as the case 
study on page 25 demonstrates. In most cases it  
is clear how particular intelligence products  
relate to the national intelligence priorities.
Ministerial authorisations
Any activity to produce intelligence on an 
Australian person by Australia’s foreign intelligence 
collection agencies requires ministerial 
authorisation. Ministers may also direct that 
other activities require prior ministerial approval. 
In the case of Australian persons who are, or 
are likely to be, involved in activities that pose a 
threat to security, the approval of the Attorney-
General must also be obtained. In DIGO’s case, 
any intelligence collected over Australian territory 
requires authorisation by the head of the agency.
Privacy rules 
Section 15 of the ISA provides that the ministers 
responsible for ASIS, DSD and DIGO must make 
written rules to regulate the communication and 
retention of intelligence information concerning 
Australian persons (privacy rules). The term 
‘Australian person’ generally includes citizens, 
permanent residents and certain companies. 
These rules regulate the agencies’ communication 
of intelligence information concerning Australian 
persons to other Australian agencies and to 
foreign authorities, including to Australia’s 
closest intelligence partners. (Communication to 
foreign authorities is also subject to additional 
requirements.)
Privacy rules require that agencies may only retain 
or communicate information about an Australian 
person where it is necessary to do so for the 
proper performance of each agency’s legislatively 
mandated functions, or where the retention or 
communication is required under another Act.
If a breach of an agency’s privacy rules is identified, 
the agency in question must advise my office 
of the incident, and the measures taken by the 
agency to protect the privacy of the Australian 
person, or Australian persons more generally. 
Adherence to this reporting requirement provides 
me with sufficient information upon which to 
decide whether appropriate remedial action has 
been taken, or further investigation and reporting 
back to my office is required.
The presumption of nationality
The privacy rules require that ASIS, DSD and DIGO 
are to presume that a person located in Australia 
is an Australian person, and that a person who is 
located outside of Australia is not an Australian 
person unless there is evidence to the contrary. 
An agency may later overturn an initial 
presumption of nationality, for example:
 u New information or evidence may indicate 
that a person overseas is an Australian person. 
24 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14
 P
A
R
T 
TW
O
 /
 P
ER
FO
RM
A
N
C
E If it was not reasonable for this information 
to have been known and considered at the 
time the initial assessment was made then 
the presumption of nationality could be 
overturned but there would have been no 
breach of the privacy rules.
 u The agency may discover that it was already 
in possession of evidence that indicated 
that a person was an Australian person that 
should have been considered in the initial 
assessment, or another Australian agency 
might have possessed that information. In this 
case the presumption of nationality would 
be overturned but, if intelligence information 
had already been communicated about the 
Australian person, there could have been a 
breach of the privacy rules. 
If the agency made a reasonable assessment of 
the nationality status of that person, based on all 
information which was available at the time, there 
is no breach of the privacy rules but the case must 
still be reported to me.
Where a presumption of nationality is later found 
to be incorrect ASIS, DSD and DIGO must advise 
my office of this and the measures taken to protect 
the privacy of the Australian concerned. 
Inspection of ASIS activities
Ministerial authorisations
There was a significant improvement in ASIS’s 
compliance with ministerial authorisation 
requirements during late 2013, compared to  
2012–13 when a number of issues had been 
identified; however, a number of breaches of 
the ISA in relation to ministerial authorisations 
occurred in the first half of 2014.
In April 2014 ASIS advised my office of a breach 
where an ASIS officer collected information by 
searching the personal property of an Australian 
person without ministerial authorisation.
Section 10A of the ISA requires the Director-
General of ASIS to report to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs on the authorised activities within 
three months of the day on which the relevant 
authorisation ceased to have effect. There were 
three breaches of section 10A of the ISA: 
 u an inspection by my office identified one 
occasion where a report on an authorisation 
that had expired had been submitted outside 
the three month period
 u ASIS advised my office of two occasions when 
ASIS failed to submit a report within three months 
of the authorisations ceasing to have effect.
My staff also identified one occasion where ASIS 
failed to inform the minister when the grounds on 
which an authorisation was issued ceased to exist 
as required by s.10(2A) of the ISA.
Protecting the privacy of  
Australian persons
We meet with ASIS staff every two months 
to discuss compliance with privacy rules and 
undertake inspections of ASIS’s dissemination of 
information about Australian persons.
In 2013–14 ASIS reported eight occasions where 
the presumption of nationality was overturned; 
that is, information came to light that an individual 
was actually an Australian person and the privacy 
rules were applied retrospectively to reporting. On 
more than one of these occasions there was initial 
inconsistency between the views of ASIS and DSD 
on whether a person was an Australian person. 
I have advised all agencies that it is important 
that agencies take a consistent approach to the 
presumption of nationality, to avoid a situation 
where agencies draw separate conclusions as to 
the nationality of a particular individual. In seven of 
these cases the initial presumption of nationality 
had been reasonable and there was no breach of 
the privacy rules.
In one instance ASIS had been aware that the 
person was Australian but this had not been well 
documented or communicated. This was a breach 
of the privacy rules. It was subsequently found that 
there was also a breach of the requirement that ASIS 
only communicate intelligence in accordance with 
government requirements and the requirement 
for ministerial authorisation before taking action to 
produce intelligence on an Australian person. There 
is further information on this case below.
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ASIS reported two breaches because the privacy 
rules were not applied to reporting on a person 
known to be an Australian person. Inspections by 
my office identified an additional two breaches 
where the privacy rules had not been applied. 
ASIS subsequently amended all four reports and 
applied the privacy rules retrospectively.
Review of operational files
ASIS activities often involve the use of human 
sources and ASIS officers are deployed in many 
countries to support a wide range of activities 
including counter-terrorism, efforts against people 
smuggling and support to military operations. 
These activities are often high-risk and sensitive. 
During the reporting period, we reviewed files 
relating to operational activities in a diverse range 
of countries where ASIS has a presence.
While the sensitive nature of ASIS’s operational 
activities means that I cannot specifically detail 
the nature and range of issues arising from these 
inspections in a public report, I can advise that 
these reviews are thorough and rigorous and 
something in which I take a keen personal interest. 
No significant issues were raised during the 
reporting period as a result of these inspections. 
CASE STUDY — a breach of the privacy rules and the ISA 
In August 2013 ASIS advised me that a March 2013 report had failed to take account of the fact 
that the individual concerned was an Australian citizen (with dual nationality) and thus the 
communication breached the privacy rules. At the time, the notification was limited to advice 
about the communication of intelligence. There was no notification about the collection of 
intelligence. 
When ASIS provided further information about the case in March 2014 I raised concerns as to 
whether:
 u the collection and passage of information in relation to this individual had adhered to 
the ISA’s ‘requirement that intelligence only be communicated in accordance with the 
Government’s requirements’ (s.6(1)(b))
 u there had been unauthorised collection against the individual breaching the ISA’s 
requirement that ASIS ‘obtain ministerial authorisation before undertaking any activity 
to produce intelligence on an Australian person’ (s.8) after ASIS first became aware of the 
individual’s dual nationality in July 2012.
ASIS investigated the case further. I received a copy of the final report from the Director-General 
in June 2014, which confirmed there had been a breach of both section 6(1)(b) and section 8 
of the ISA, as well as a breach of the privacy rules. The Director-General directed that remedial 
action include:
 u further checks to determine whether there had been any other breaches of section 6(1)(b)
 u updated guidelines, training and advice to staff on the issue, including on the requirement 
for ministerial authorisations for Australian persons
 u a review of systems, processes and procedures relating to the application of privacy rules
 u a code of conduct and other investigations as necessary to determine appropriate action in 
relation to the individuals responsible for the breaches.
I will monitor the implementation of these actions.
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of weapons
Schedule 2 of the ISA requires the Director-
General of ASIS to provide the IGIS with:
 u copies of all approvals issued by the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs in respect of the provision 
of weapons and the training in and use of 
weapons and self-defence techniques in ASIS
 u a written report if a staff member or agent  
of ASIS discharges a weapon other than  
in training.
This reporting requirement was met during  
2013–14 and I am satisfied that the need for 
limited numbers of ASIS staff to have access to 
weapons for self-defence in order to perform 
their duties is genuine. I am also satisfied that 
appropriate controls are in place to limit the 
circumstances in which weapons may be  
used for self-defence.
An inspection of records relating to the provision 
by ASIS of training in the use of self-defence 
techniques and weapons was conducted in  
May 2014. It was apparent that governance  
and recordkeeping improvements implemented 
in the previous reporting period were proving 
effective.
The May 2014 inspection confirmed one breach  
of the ISA, where an ASIS officer who had 
not been approved for training in or the use 
of weapons discharged a firearm in a skills 
maintenance session in March 2014. This incident 
had already been brought to my attention by 
ASIS. ASIS reported a further two breaches of the 
ISA relating to the unapproved use of weapons 
by ASIS officers during the reporting period: one 
at a skills maintenance session in September 
2013 and one at a firing range in December 2013.
Inspection of DSD activities
OIGIS staff members have access to and ongoing 
visibility of DSD’s activities. We undertake regular 
inspections on a range of DSD activities, with 
a particular focus on the privacy of Australians. 
More generally, staff may inspect any activity 
undertaken by DSD, with regard to legality 
and propriety, and whether the activities are 
consistent with human rights. The legality of any 
DSD activity is assessed by reference to whether 
the purpose was consistent with a function of 
DSD, whether it was within the limits set out in 
the relevant legislation, and whether the activity 
had an appropriate level of approval.
DSD can only cooperate with an authority of 
another country to the extent authorised by 
the Minister for Defence. These authorising 
instruments are reviewed by my office. 
Ministerial authorisations
During 2013–14, OIGIS staff continued to  
review all ministerial authorisations presented 
to the Minister for Defence. Overall, I observed 
a high level of compliance with authorisations 
and relevant directions issued to DSD by  
the minister.
Throughout 2013–14, I continued to monitor 
records of intelligence collection activities 
undertaken by DSD under ministerial 
authorisations. Following the implementation 
of a number of improved governance and 
administrative arrangements in DSD in mid-
2013, I observed a significant improvement 
in the agency’s ability to self-identify and 
appropriately respond to compliance risks 
during the reporting period.
We also conducted a small number of non-
routine spot checks and inspection projects 
to assess how DSD deals with targets where 
there is a higher than usual compliance risk. 
These inspections demonstrated a high level 
of understanding by DSD staff of legislative 
requirements and thresholds for undertaking 
activities under the ISA and the ASIO Act.
In August 2013, I completed a review of an 
incident which came to my attention in  
mid-2013, involving a breach of the ISA where 
intelligence targeting occurred for several days 
after DSD had determined the target to be an 
Australian person. While I found no evidence of 
intentional wrongdoing, my review highlighted 
a number of compliance concerns in relation to 
the event and DSD’s handling of the matter.
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DSD subsequently initiated an investigation into 
the incident and identified a number of areas 
for improvement in its internal policy framework 
and procedures. DSD has kept my office 
informed of progress on the implementation  
of revised procedures, and I am satisfied that 
action taken in response to my original  
concerns is appropriate.
In January 2014, DSD separately provided to 
me their final report on a breach of the ISA 
which occurred during October 2013, where 
incomplete records had resulted in DSD 
conducting intelligence collection activity on  
a person known to be Australian.
During the reporting period I continued 
to inspect cancellations of ministerial 
authorisations and non-renewal reports to the 
Minister for Defence under sections 10 and 10A 
of the ISA. In September 2013, as part of our 
regular inspection of DSD activities, I asked DSD 
to confirm that intelligence collection against 
several subjects had ceased (as had been 
advised by DSD to the Minister for Defence). 
DSD advised that collection against one subject 
had continued for several months beyond the 
expiry of the ministerial authorisation, in breach 
of the requirements specified in the ISA.
This finding in September 2013 contributed 
to a decision by DSD to consider its quality 
assurance processes for managing specific types 
of ministerial authorisations. In late 2013, DSD 
initiated a thorough retrospective analysis of 
cancelled or expired ministerial authorisations. 
This review is discussed below under Legacy 
incidents: review of ministerial authorisation 
cancellations and non-renewals. 
Protecting the privacy of Australians 
In accordance with their obligations, DSD 
continued to report to me cases where a 
presumption of nationality had later been 
found to be incorrect, and the measures taken 
to protect the privacy of the Australian person. 
I found the actions taken by DSD in response to 
incorrect presumptions of nationality occurring 
during the reporting period, including the timely 
notification to other intelligence agencies, to  
be generally appropriate.
In two cases there were breaches of the privacy 
rules as the presumption of nationality was 
not applied reasonably by DSD. In both cases, 
intelligence collection activity occurred against 
Australian persons in circumstances where DSD 
already had information indicating that the 
individuals concerned were Australian persons,  
but in each case members of staff had failed 
to make appropriate inquiries of existing 
DSD records. In addition to these cases being 
breaches of the presumption rule in the privacy 
rules, the action taken to produce intelligence 
on an Australian person was inconsistent with 
the ministerial authorisation requirement in  
the ISA.
During 2013–14, I assessed two instances 
where DSD communicated information about 
an Australian person not in accordance with 
the privacy rules. Both incidents resulted from 
a failure to follow established compliance 
processes. I am satisfied the remedial action 
taken in both cases appropriately addressed the 
privacy of the Australian persons concerned. 
The privacy rules and cooperation  
with signals intelligence partners
DSD works particularly closely with a small 
number of allied signals intelligence agencies. 
During the reporting period, DSD reported to 
me several instances where it had identified 
that one of these partner agencies had made 
an incorrect presumption of nationality, and 
had inadvertently communicated information 
on an Australian person. I was satisfied that DSD 
followed up with partner agencies concerning 
any required remedial action in a timely and 
appropriate manner.
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Compliance with the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979
DSD brought to my attention one case where a 
DSD officer who was assisting with the execution 
of a warrant had not been listed as an authorised 
person for the purpose of exercising the authority 
of a warrant in respect of a telecommunications 
service. DSD took remedial action immediately 
upon learning of the error. I am satisfied that DSD’s 
actions were appropriate and that this error was 
administrative in nature. 
Legacy incidents: review of ministerial 
authorisation cancellations and  
non-renewals
DSD conducted a thorough retrospective analysis 
in late 2013 of cancelled or expired ministerial 
authorisations, and reported the outcome of this 
review to me in June 2014. This review reported on 
three previously identified compliance incidents, 
and identified a further three instances where 
intelligence targeting continued beyond the 
cancellation of the ministerial authorisation during 
2011 and 2012. 
In all instances, DSD found intelligence targeting 
continued for periods ranging from several 
weeks to more than a month beyond the date 
the ministerial authorisation was cancelled by 
the Minister for Defence (at DSD’s request). DSD 
assessed that each incident demonstrated a 
failure by DSD to follow established procedures 
for the management of cancellations. In June 
2014 DSD advised the Minister for Defence about 
these breaches of the ministerial authorisation 
requirement under the ISA and the remedial 
actions which had been taken.
Legacy compliance incidents
Prompted in part by some of the compliance 
concerns raised by my office, DSD also initiated 
a full review of their unfinalised compliance 
reporting records, covering legacy compliance 
issues raised and addressed since 2011, but not 
reported to my office.
The findings from the legacy investigations were 
progressively reported to me in the second half  
of the 2013–14 reporting period.
Inspection project involving DSD 
In January 2014, I initiated an inspection project into specific activities of DSD conducted in 
response to a high-priority collection effort directed by government. The project found a  
high level of compliance by DSD in relation to:
 u obligations imposed by ministerial authorisations and ministerial directions issued  
under the ISA
 u intelligence reporting and dissemination
 u coordination between DSD and other Australian intelligence agencies
 u actions taken to protect the privacy of Australian persons.
In a small number of the cases investigated, DSD staff did not consistently follow established 
recordkeeping requirements. While there was no breach in these cases, I note that a number 
of compliance incidents involving breaches of the ISA over the previous year had also resulted 
from a failure to adhere to recordkeeping requirements, thereby constituting a significant 
compliance risk. 
Consistent with routine inspections of DSD, and reviews conducted internally by DSD of 
compliance incidents, the project findings highlighted the importance of best practice 
corporate recordkeeping for ensuring high levels of compliance. At the end of the reporting 
period, DSD advised it was updating a number of compliance frameworks which will help 
increase staff understanding and minimise compliance risks in similar cases. 
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Three of the legacy incidents investigated by DSD 
involved collection against persons already known 
by DSD to be Australian persons, breaching the 
requirements of the ISA. These incidents, which 
occurred between 2010 and 2012, all resulted  
from a failure by DSD to follow good 
recordkeeping practices.
While none of these incidents involved any 
intentional wrongdoing, these incidents were 
nonetheless of a serious nature.
DSD also reported to me a breach of the ISA 
which had occurred during 2011 where, due to 
human error, intelligence targeting against three 
Australian persons had occurred for less than 
one day without a ministerial authorisation. As 
the error was reported by the responsible analyst 
to DSD’s compliance section that day, DSD was 
able to take immediate remedial action and no 
communications were collected.
Two legacy incidents from 2012 involved the 
continued collection on an Australian person after 
a presumption of nationality had been found to be 
incorrect, due to a technical error in the collection 
system. This continued collection was inconsistent 
with the ministerial authorisation requirements 
in the ISA. DSD has advised that the collection 
system in question is no longer in use by DSD,  
and similar technical problems are unlikely to 
occur with the current systems in use.
While it is regrettable the legacy incidents were 
not reported to me sooner, I am pleased DSD 
has focused on improving staff understanding 
of compliance requirements, through improved 
compliance guidance and training for staff. During 
the first half of 2014, DSD continued to report to me 
any significant compliance issues as they occurred.
I was also pleased to see that, in most cases, 
DSD analysts proactively reported incidents to 
their internal compliance section in a timely and 
appropriate manner, even where doing so would 
bring attention to a mistake on their part. This 
speaks well of DSD’s compliance culture.
At the end of the 2013–14 reporting period, 
DSD was in the process of adding a number of 
additional safeguards to technical systems as part 
of overall improvements designed to minimise 
compliance incidents. 
Legacy privacy rules cases
Several of the legacy incidents reported to 
me during 2013–14 involved overturned 
presumptions of nationality under the privacy 
rules. While no issues were identified with DSD’s 
application of the privacy rules in these cases, 
several of the incidents occurred prior to an 
amendment to the privacy rules approved by the 
then Minister for Defence in October 2012, which 
removed the requirement for DSD to consult with 
me about the actions taken to protect the privacy 
of the Australian person concerned. In most cases, 
however, DSD took appropriate action to protect 
the privacy of the Australian person at the time the 
incorrect presumption was first identified.
DSD has implemented a number of changes to 
internal procedures on reporting under the privacy 
rules since these incidents. I will continue to 
monitor DSD’s response to compliance incidents 
over the 2014–15 reporting period through regular 
inspection activity, and ongoing engagement  
with DSD staff. 
Monitoring DIGO
During 2013–14 we conducted several inspection 
visits to DIGO, including DIGO’s online records of 
its collection activities.  As in past years, this office 
focused on DIGO’s compliance with the terms 
of each ministerial authorisation issued to the 
agency by the Minister for Defence, noted the 
time taken to cancel collection activities when 
the grounds for the ministerial authorisation had 
materially changed, and reviewed the accuracy 
of reports provided to the Minister for Defence 
following the expiry or cancellation of a ministerial 
authorisation.
My staff also closely examined the adequacy of 
DIGO’s attempts to determine the nationality of 
individuals or entities before initiating targeted 
collection activities (to establish whether or not 
a ministerial authorisation was required). We also 
examined the extent of cooperation between 
DIGO and other intelligence collection agencies 
when seeking intelligence about the same target 
or requesting a joint ministerial authorisation.
No significant errors or breaches were identified. 
Based on these inspection activities, I am 
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under the ISA seriously and has put in place robust 
systems to encourage compliance.
My staff and I discussed specific compliance issues 
with the Director DIGO and with relevant DIGO 
officers at several meetings.  
Monitoring DIO and ONA
As has been the practice of this office over many 
years, we continue to exercise a ‘light touch’ 
approach to the activities of ONA and DIO.  As 
these agencies do not collect covert intelligence, 
their activities are far less likely than those of the 
collection agencies to intrude upon the personal 
affairs of Australian persons.
We aim to review ONA and DIO’s compliance 
with their privacy guidelines at least twice a year.  
In 2013–14 we undertook two inspection visits 
to DIO and one to ONA.  A further visit to ONA 
planned for June 2014 was postponed to the next 
reporting period due to competing priorities.
These inspections revealed that ONA and DIO 
are generally compliant with the requirements of 
their privacy guidelines and that they each take 
their privacy responsibilities seriously.  The few 
non-compliance issues identified tended to be 
questions of nuance or administration, rather than 
whether or not relevant intelligence information 
about Australian persons or entities should be 
included in their products.
My staff also engaged with ONA and DIO on 
wider Australian intelligence community issues 
and, in the case of the Public Interest Disclosure 
scheme, to gather information relevant to the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman.
My office also conducted a review of DIO’s 
implementation of recommendations from a 2012 
inquiry examining DIO’s analytical integrity.  This 
review activity is covered on page 17.
Cross-agency inspections
Use of assumed identities
Part 1AC of the Crimes Act 1914 and corresponding 
State and Territory laws enable ASIO and ASIS 
officers to create and use assumed identities 
in carrying out their functions. The legislation 
protects authorised officers from civil and criminal 
liability where they use an assumed identity in a 
circumstance that would otherwise be considered 
unlawful. Similarly, the legislation provides 
protections to the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory agencies responsible for providing the 
evidence of an assumed identity in this context.
The legislation also imposes reporting, 
administration and audit regimes on those 
agencies using assumed identities. ASIO and 
ASIS are required to conduct six-monthly audits 
of assumed identity records and provide the IGIS 
with an annual report containing information on 
the assumed identities created and used during 
the year. The Director-General of Security and the 
Director-General of ASIS provided reports covering 
the activities of their respective agencies for the 
2012–13 reporting period. Nothing in the reports 
caused me concern.
This year, my staff also inspected ASIS’s assumed 
identity records. No issues of concern were 
identified during the inspection, and I was satisfied 
that ASIS is complying with Commonwealth, 
State and Territory legislation. I have asked ASIS 
to provide me with copies of their internal audit 
reports in addition to the annual report in future, 
as is ASIO’s current practice. Provision of this 
additional level of detail will strengthen existing 
oversight mechanisms.
ASIS advised of a breach of its internal policy in 
2014 where equipment was purchased without 
first obtaining an assumed identity. This was 
due to a staff member not understanding the 
requirements. ASIS has put procedures in place to 
ensure this does not happen again.
Access to sensitive financial 
information by intelligence agencies
The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006 (the AML/CTF Act) provides a 
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legal framework in which designated agencies 
are able to access and share financial intelligence 
information created or held by the Australian 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC). All intelligence agencies and the 
office of the IGIS are designated agencies for the 
purposes of the AML/CTF Act.
The IGIS is party to an MOU with AUSTRAC. This 
MOU establishes an agreed understanding of IGIS’s 
role in monitoring agencies’ access to, and use of, 
AUSTRAC information.
In oversighting the agencies’ use of AUSTRAC 
information, we check that there is a 
demonstrated intelligence purpose pertinent to 
the agencies’ functions, that access is appropriately 
limited, searches are focused, and information 
passed to both Australian agencies and foreign 
intelligence counterparts is correctly authorised. 
ASIO
Early in the reporting period I finalised my annual 
statement for 2012–13 to the Attorney-General 
on the outcome of my compliance monitoring 
activities in ASIO, concerning access to, and  
use of, AUSTRAC information in the previous 
reporting period. 
I noted that ASIO was not compliant with 
AUSTRAC’s guidelines on the storage of certain 
AUSTRAC information. ASIO subsequently began 
negotiations with AUSTRAC to reach a solution 
and has since been provided with a waiver 
from the CEO of AUSTRAC in respect of the 
storage requirements on the condition that ASIO 
implement internal user access controls to this 
sensitive information.
During my 2013–14 inspection program, a 
breach of Section 133(1) of the AML/CTF Act was 
identified whereby ASIO communicated AUSTRAC 
information to a foreign intelligence agency 
without first receiving appropriate undertakings 
for the protection and use of the information. 
This breach will be included in my next annual 
statement to the Attorney-General.
ASIS
Early in the reporting period I finalised my 
annual statement for 2012–13 to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs on the outcome of my compliance 
monitoring activities in ASIS, concerning access to, 
and use of, AUSTRAC information in the previous 
reporting period.
In that annual statement I noted two areas of 
shortcoming in 2012–13; the first in relation to the 
accurate receipt of AUSTRAC information within 
ASIS and the second regarding deficiencies in 
relation to reporting movements of currency into 
or out of Australia.
Inspections by my office throughout 2013–14 
have indicated that shortcomings by ASIS in 
relation to recordkeeping have continued and this 
will be included in my statement to the Foreign 
Minister. No deficiencies regarding movements  
of currency into or out of Australia were observed 
in 2013–14. 
Summary of IGIS financial 
performance and resources  
for outcomes
OIGIS received an unqualified audit report from 
the Australian National Audit Office for its 2013–14 
financial statements. A summary of this office’s 
financial performance can be found on the  
next page.
The office operated within available resources  
in 2013–14 and ended the year with a surplus  
of $226 333.
In relation to expenditure, the most significant 
budget variances consisted of $18 000 allocated 
for security clearances for ongoing staff members, 
$13 000 allocated for potential software licences 
and a $4000 difference in relation to losses on the 
disposal of assets. Changes in the government 
bond rate at the end of financial year resulted in a 
$25 000 downward movement in reported leave 
liabilities and consequently reduced employee 
expenses. Also, the original budget anticipated 
a pay rise from 1 July 2014 for staff. The pay rise, 
which has not occurred, had been expected to 
increase the reported leave liabilities at end of 
financial year by approximately $12 000.
Appropriation funding decreased slightly from 
$2 180 000 in 2012–13 to $2 179 000 in 2013–14 
as a result of savings measures. During 2013–14 
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$139 000 inquiry funding.
Net equity increased from $1 401 888 in 2012–13 
to $1 653 529 in 2013–14. Movements in equity 
included a $226 333 increase in retained surplus 
and a $9308 increase in the asset revaluation 
reserve following an asset revaluation exercise 
conducted at 30 June 2014. Contributed Equity 
also increased from $447 000 in 2012–13 to  
$463 000 in 2013–14. Movements in Contributed 
Equity included capital funding of $69 000 
received offset by a reduction of $53 000 following 
the repeal of an unspent 2004–05 equity injection.
The following tables can be found in Annex 3:
Table 3.1 – Agency Resource Statement and 
Resource for Outcomes 2013–14, and
Table 3.2 – Expenses and Resources for Outcome 1.
OIGIS has one outcome and one program.
Trends in finances
Significant changes to the finances of the office 
during 2013–14 included:
 u A $74 301 increase in own-source revenue 
due to significant inquiry funding received in 
2013–14 ($139 000) offset by a decline in other 
s.31 revenue.
 u A $146 574 decrease in employee expenses.  
The decrease was partly due to a staff 
redundancy incorporated in the 2012–13 
figures. Movements in the government bond 
rate and significant levels of leave taken during 
2013–14 also contributed to the decrease in 
employee expenses.
 u A $30 100 increase in supplier expenses. 
Increases in expenditure included $7376 
in legal expenses, $7516 in security vetting 
expenses, $10 300 in overseas travel and  
$10 693 increase in staff training. 
 u A $33 842 increase in suppliers payable due 
mainly to outstanding reimbursements to 
home agencies for seconded staff.
 u A $25 418 increase in other payables due to  
leave liabilities to be transferred in relation  
to departing staff.
2013–14
OUTCOME 1 $
2012–13
OUTCOME 1 $
Change from
previous year
Revenue from 
Government 2 179 000 2 180 000 -
Other income 274 548 200 247 + 37%
TOTAL INCOME 2 453 548 2 380 247
Employee expenses 1 916 059 2 062 633 - 7%
Supplier expenses 270 683 240 583 + 12%
Other expenses 40 473 39 608 + 2%
TOTAL EXPENSES 2 227 215 2 342 824
OPERATING RESULT 226 333 37 423
Financial assets 2 437 208 2 106 737 + 15%
Non-financial assets 63 735 89 984 - 41%
Liabilities 847 414 794 833 + 6%
NET ASSETS = A + B – C 1 653 529 1 401 888
A
B
C
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AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Corporate governance
Organisational structure
Senior positions occupied during 2013–14  
were as follows:
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
(Statutory officer)
Dr Vivienne Thom
Assistant Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security (SES Band 1)
Mr Jake Blight
Senior management committees
The OIGIS Audit Committee is the only senior 
management committee for the agency. The 
functions of this committee are detailed in the 
‘Internal audit and risk management’ section  
of this chapter.
Corporate and operational planning
OIGIS’s corporate and operational planning 
processes are straightforward in nature, reflecting 
the small size and specialist function of the office.
The office addresses these matters through:
 u an annual forward planning process to set 
strategic priorities
 u weekly meetings between the IGIS and senior 
staff members, to review and document 
operational priorities
 u monthly meetings between the IGIS and all office 
staff, during which internal guidelines, procedures 
and governance issues are discussed
 u a forward plan for inspection activities in each 
intelligence agency, which is determined in 
consultation with the relevant agency head  
(in accordance with s. 9A of the IGIS Act).
Internal audit and risk management
The membership and functions of the Audit 
Committee are structured according to the guidance 
in s.46 of the Financial Management and Accountability 
Act 1997 and the Financial Management and 
Accountability Regulations 1997. At 30 June 2014 the 
members were Mr Matthew King (Treasury) as Chair, 
Mr Trevor Kennedy (Attorney-General’s Department) 
and Mr Jake Blight (OIGIS) as members. The Inspector-
General attends the meetings as an observer.
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to consider matters including:
 u risk management
 u internal control
 u financial statements
 u compliance requirements
 u internal audit
 u external audit
 u governance arrangements.
In this reporting period the Committee also 
considered the steps taken in preparation for 
the commencement of the Public Governance, 
Performance and Accountability Act 2013  
(the PGPA Act).
The Committee reviews the Risk Management Plan 
annually based on its assessment of the office’s risk 
performance over the period. The Risk Management 
Plan includes controls designed to mitigate risks 
including the following: 
 u personnel related risks
 u accidental or intentional loss of information
 u segregation of duties
 u failure or compromise of information technology 
systems
 u physical security of the office and facilities
 u corporate liability
 u fraud prevention, detection and management
 u corporate compliance requirements.
Through its various mitigation strategies, the residual 
risk accepted by the office is maintained within the 
low–medium levels in each of the categories listed 
above.
Implementation of the revised 
Protective Security Policy Framework
The Australian Government’s Protective 
Security Policy Framework provides a structure 
for Australian government agencies to 
proportionately and effectively manage security 
risks and provide the necessary protection of the 
Government’s people, information and assets. The 
governance arrangements and core policies in the 
framework describe the higher-level protective 
security outcomes and identify mandatory 
requirements my office must meet.
As at 30 June 2014, we were fully compliant with 
32 of the 33 mandatory requirements and partially 
compliant with one. A risk mitigation strategy is in 
place for the partially compliant requirement.
Ethical standards and fraud control
We maintained our commitment to ethical 
standards by ensuring staff were aware of the 
relevant requirements. We held an information 
session for staff and displayed posters prominently 
in the office concerning changes to the APS Values 
that took effect from 1 July 2013. 
Nominated staff attended APSC Ethics Advisors 
network meetings. All OIGIS staff must meet 
the standards required to hold a Positive Vet 
clearance which includes, among other things, 
consideration of an individual’s maturity, 
responsibility, and honesty. Financial management 
and accountability requirements for the Office 
were set out in Chief Executive Instructions (CEIs), 
which were issued by the Inspector-General under 
the Financial Management and Accountability Act 
1997. In preparation for the commencement of the 
PGPA Act the CEIs were reviewed to be replaced 
by Accountable Authority Instructions.
Delegations were updated to take account of 
changes associated with the PGPA Act. Staff are 
required to sign a statement that they have read 
and understood all new delegations.
The Office’s procurement policy and guidelines 
establish clear standards of ethical behaviour for  
all staff responsible for procurement.
While the Risk Management Plan is comprehensive 
in that it includes fraud prevention, detection and 
management, the office also maintains a separate 
Fraud Control Plan, updated annually, which 
explores in greater detail risks of that type and 
how they are managed. 
Employment of SES Officers
The office has one SES position filled by Mr Jake 
Blight. The terms and conditions of Mr Blight’s 
employment, including salary, are set out in a 
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Section 24(1) determination and are based broadly 
on SES remuneration within the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Employment of persons for a  
particular inquiry
Section 35(2AA) of the IGIS Act requires me to 
report on the employment under s. 32(3) of any 
person to perform functions and exercise powers 
for the purposes of a particular inquiry, and 
any delegation under s. 32AA to such a person. 
No person was employed under s. 32(3) in the 
reporting period.
Reports by the Auditor-General, 
Parliamentary Committees, the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman or  
an agency capability review
There were no reports on the operation of 
the office (other than the report on financial 
statements) by any of the above bodies. It 
should be noted that the office is not within the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
The office has received an unqualified audit report 
from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 
in relation to its financial statements.
Further details of OIGIS interaction with 
parliamentary committees are available in the 
Overview section of this report. 
Management of human 
resources
Organisational profile
At 30 June 2014, the office had 12 ongoing  
APS employees located in the Australian Capital 
Territory (not including the Inspector-General). 
Two employees worked part-time.
This compares to 11 ongoing and 2 non ongoing 
APS employees located in the Australian Capital 
Territory at 30 June 2013.
The office has a staffing strategy of maintaining 
a number of positions for staff who are on 
temporary transfers from other agencies. At the 
end of the reporting period four of the ongoing 
staff were on temporary transfer. This allows the 
office to acquire skills that are available in other 
agencies and provides valuable development 
opportunities for employees. One of these 
employees returned to their home agency at the 
end of the reporting period — this position will 
not be filled.
The profile of the organisation is summarised in 
the following two graphs:
SES Band 1 OIGIS 
Broadband 4 
2014 
(EL2)
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
OIGIS 
Broadband 3 
(EL1) 
OIGIS 
Broadband 2 
(APS4-APS6) 
Part Time Ongoing Full Time Ongoing 
Female Male 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
SES Band 1 OIGIS 
Broadband 4
(EL2) 
OIGIS 
Broadband 3 
(EL1) 
OIGIS 
Broadband 2 
(APS4-APS6) 
Gender Balance as at 30 June 2014 
(by employment level) 
36 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14
 P
A
R
T 
TH
RE
E 
/ 
M
A
N
A
G
EM
EN
T 
A
N
D
 A
C
C
O
U
N
TA
BI
LI
TY Employment frameworks
At 1 July 2013, all non-SES staff were employed 
under the OIGIS Enterprise Agreement 2011–2014. 
One SES staff member was employed under a 
section 24(1) determination.
The salary range available to APS employees in 
OIGIS throughout 2013–14 is provided at Annex 2.
The only notable non-salary benefit for OIGIS 
non-SES staff is a taxable annual allowance in 
recognition of the requirement to undergo 
regular and intrusive security clearance processes 
necessary to maintain a Positive Vet clearance, as 
well as other restrictions placed on employees as a 
result of reviewing the activities of the intelligence 
agencies. The annual allowance was $1093 per 
annum as at 30 June 2014.
Training and staff development
We continued the internal training program 
introduced in early 2012. The program of short 
training sessions, run once a fortnight, ensures that 
staff develop and maintain specialised knowledge 
and skills, and supplements on the job training. 
Topics covered in 2013–14 included:
 u Public Interest Disclosure legislation
 u IGIS Act secrecy provisions
 u The role of the Commonwealth/Immigration 
Ombudsman
 u Approaches to compliance
Two staff members enrolled in a Certificate IV 
in Government (Investigations). Staff were also 
provided with regular opportunities throughout 
2013–14 to attend other training courses 
and seminars relevant to their roles. A studies 
assistance scheme is also available to reimburse 
employees for approved courses of study.
Performance pay
OIGIS does not have a performance based  
pay scheme.
Other information
Purchasing
All procurement and purchasing activities 
conducted by the office were in accordance  
with the Commonwealth Procurement Rules.
Consultants
Generally a small number of consultants may be 
engaged each year by the office on an ‘as-required’ 
basis. Consultants are used where short-term 
resources are inadequate or specialist expertise is 
required. The security requirements of the office 
and the specialist nature of the consultancy work 
often means that consultants are directly sourced.
Where the work is more general in nature the 
office will, where appropriate, access consultants 
selected by PM&C through an open tender or 
panel selection process.
The decision to engage a consultant is made 
in accordance with the FMA Act and related 
regulations including the Commonwealth 
Procurement Rules and relevant internal 
guidelines.
Total actual expenditure on consultancy contracts 
for 2013–14 was $15 993 (GST inclusive). This 
represents two consultancy contracts for legal 
services and one relating to the revaluation of 
assets. This compares to consultancy expenditure 
of $7000 (GST inclusive) in 2012–13.
Annual reports contain information about actual 
expenditure on contracts for consultancies. 
Information on the value of contracts and 
consultancies is available on the AusTender website
ANAO Access Clauses
No contracts for greater than $100 000 were 
entered into during the reporting period, which 
did not provide for the Auditor-General to have 
access to the contractor’s premises.
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Exempt contracts
No contracts have been entered into during the 
reporting period that have been exempt from 
publishing on AusTender.
Legal services
Expenditure on legal services fluctuates from year 
to year and is largely dependent upon the nature 
of the inquiries undertaken.
In 2013–14 one legal advice was obtained from 
Australian Government Solicitors, to a total cost  
of $7626 (GST inclusive). Advice was also sought 
from counsel in one matter with costs totalling 
$7486 (GST inclusive). 
The total expenditure for legal services compares 
to $7000 (GST inclusive) in 2012–13.
Information Publication Scheme
The Information Publication Scheme (IPS) applies 
to Australian Government agencies that are 
subject to the FOI Act. The IPS specifies categories 
of information that agencies must publish online. 
Agencies can also choose to publish other 
information under the IPS. As an exempt agency 
under the FOI Act, the scheme does not apply to 
OIGIS.
Indexed file lists were published on OIGIS’s website 
in the reporting period in accordance with the 
Senate Continuing Order No 10 (Harradine Order).
Freedom of information
This office is an exempt agency for the purposes  
of the FOI Act. 
Advertising and market research
OIGIS did not incur any expenditure on 
recruitment advertising, advertising campaigns, 
market research, polling or direct mailing during 
the reporting period.
Ecologically sustainable development 
and environmental performance
The office, through its co-location with PM&C, 
continues to benefit from that Department’s 
commitment to energy saving measures. This 
includes the large number of energy and water 
saving measures, designed to reduce greenhouse 
emissions, which are incorporated into the 
building in which we are among the occupants  
(1 National Circuit). These measures include,  
but are not limited to, energy efficient lighting, 
heating and cooling.
Due to the small size of the office, PM&C does 
not separately measure the utilities used by OIGIS 
and provides these utilities free of charge. For this 
reason, ecologically sustainable development  
and details of environmental performance are  
not specifically quantified in this report.
Nonetheless, the office is committed to ensuring 
that its activities are environmentally responsible. 
While the majority of the office’s infrastructure 
is provided and maintained by PM&C, there 
are a number of areas for which I am directly 
responsible in which I take into account the 
environmental impact and act accordingly to 
minimise it. These include:
 u recycled paper was used for around 98 per 
cent of the office’s photocopying, facsimile 
reports and document printing in 2013–14
 u staff configure printers to default to  
double-sided print
 u all unclassified office paper and cardboard 
waste is recycled
 u empty toner cartridges are recycled, except 
where security considerations apply.
38 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14
 P
A
R
T 
TH
RE
E 
/ 
M
A
N
A
G
EM
EN
T 
A
N
D
 A
C
C
O
U
N
TA
BI
LI
TY Disability reporting
Since 1994, Commonwealth departments and 
agencies have reported on their performance as 
policy adviser, purchaser, employer, regulator and 
provider under the Commonwealth Disability 
Strategy. In 2007–08, reporting on the employer 
role was transferred to the Australian Public Service 
Commission’s State of the Service Report and the 
APS Statistical Bulletin. These reports are available 
at www.apsc.gov.au. From 2010–11, departments 
and agencies have no longer been required to 
report on these functions.
The Commonwealth Disability Strategy has been 
overtaken by the National Disability Strategy 
2010–2020, which sets out a ten year national 
policy framework to improve the lives of people 
with disability, promote participation and create 
a more inclusive society. A high level two-yearly 
report will track progress against each of the six 
outcome areas of the Strategy and present a 
picture of how people with disability are faring. 
The first of these reports will be available in late 
2014, and can be found at www.dss.gov.au. 
Work health and safety
Due to its small size, the office does not have a 
Health and Safety Committee. Instead, health and 
safety matters are addressed at all-staff meetings, 
Audit Committee meetings, and, as the need 
arises, directly with me through team leaders 
and the Health and Safety Representative. During 
2013–14 a new representative was appointed and 
completed the relevant five-day training course.
No notifiable incidents resulting from undertakings 
carried out by the office have occurred during the 
year that would require reporting under the Work 
Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act).
No investigations were conducted relating to 
undertakings carried out by the office and no 
notices were given to the office under Part 10 of 
the WHS Act.
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OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
STATEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
for the year ended 30 June 2014 
Notes
2014
$
2013
$
NET COST OF SERVICES
Expenses
Employee benefits 3A 1 916 059 2 062 633
Supplier 3B 270 683 240 583
Depreciation and amortisation 3C 37 999 39 608
Loss on asset disposal 3D 2 474 -
Total Expenses 2 227 215 2 342 824
Own-Source Income
Own-source revenue
Other revenue 4A 172 548 98 247
Total own-source income 172 548 98 247
Gains
Other gains 4B 102 000 102 000
Total gains 102 000 102 000
Total own-source income 274 548 200 247
Net Cost of services 1 952 667 2 142 577
Revenue from Government 4C 2 179 000 2 180 000
Surplus attributable to the  Australian  Government 226 333 37 423
OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
Items not subject to subsequent reclassification to net 
cost of services
Changes in asset revaluation surplus 9 308 -
Total comprehensive income attributable to the 
Australian Government 235 641 37 423
The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes. 
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STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION
as at 30 June 2014 
Notes
2013-14
$
2012-13
$
ASSETS
Financial Assets
Cash and  cash  equivalents 6A 207 005 203 783
Trade and other receivables 6B 2 230 203 1 902 954
Total financial assets 2 437 208 2 106 737
Non-Financial Assets
Property, plant and  equipment 7A & 7B 63 735 86 643
Other non-financial assets 7C - 3 341
Total non-financial assets 63 735 89 984
Total Assets 2 500 943 2 196 721
LIABILITIES
Payables
Suppliers 8A 38 800 4 958
Other payables 8B 78 226 52 808
Total payables 117 026 57 766
Provisions
Employee provisions 9A 730 388 737 067
Total provisions 730 388 737 067
Total Liabilities 847 414 794 833
Net Assets 1 653 529 1 401 881
EQUITY
Parent Entity Interest
Contributed equity 463 000 447 000
Reserves 16 105 6 796
Retained surplus 1 174 424 948 092
Total parent entity interest 1 653 529 1 401 888
Total Equity 1 653 529 1 401 888
The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes. 
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CASH FLOW STATEMENT
for the year ended 30 June 2014 
Notes
2013-14
$
2012-13
$
OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Cash received
Appropriations 2 262 487 2 236 999
Net GST received 8 637 7 131
Other cash received 401 110 63 568
Total cash received 2 672 234 2 307 698
Cash used
Employees (1 923 498) (2 010 657)
Suppliers (349 938) (227 042)
Section 31 receipts transferred  to OPA (401 110) (63 568)
Other - -
Total cash  used (2 674 546) (2 301 267)
Net cash from  operating activities 10 (2 312) 6 431
INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Cash received
Proceeds from sales of property, plant and equipment - -
Total cash  received - -
Cash used
Purchase of property, plant and  equipment (2 723) -
Total cash  used (2 723) -
Net cash from (used by) investing activities (2 723) -
FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Cash received
Contributed equity 8 257 -
Total cash received 8 257 -
Net cash from financial activities 8 257 -
Net increase in cash held 3 222 6 431
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the reporting
period 203 783 197 352
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the reporting period 10 207 005 203 783
The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes. 
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SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS 
as at 30 June 2014 
2014
$
2013
$
BY TYPE
Commitments Receivable
Net GST receivable on commitments 25 654 26 324
Total Commitments Receivable 25 654 26 324
Commitments Payable
Other Commitments
Other 272 971 272 971
Operating Leases 9 216 16 589
Total Other Commitments 282 187 289 560
Net Commitments by Type 256 533 263 236
BY MATURITY
Commitments Receivable
Within I year 5 634 5 634
Between 1 to 5 years 20 020 20 690
More than 5 years - -
Total operating lease income 25 654 26 324
Commitments Payable
Operating Lease Commitments
Within 1 year 7 373 7 373
Between 1 to 5 years 1 843 9 216
More than 5 years - -
Total Operating Lease Commitments 9 216 16 589
Other Commitments Payable
Within I year 54 594 54 594
Between 1 to 5 years 218 377 218 377
More than 5 years - -
Total Other Commitments Payable 272 971 272 971
Net Commitments by Maturity 256 533 263 236
Note:  Commitments are GST inclusive where relevant.
The above schedule should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes. 
OIGIS in its capacity as a lessee holds one motor vehicle operating leases.  The lease has contracted monthly 
payments of $614.42 and expires 13 September 2015.  
OIGIS also holds agreements with PM&C requiring an annual payment of $50,600 for IT support services and 
$3,994 for payroll services.  These agreements are in place for the current and following four years. 
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for year ended 30 June 2014 
Note 1 – Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
1.1 Objectives of the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
The Office of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (OIGIS) is an Australian Government controlled 
not-for-profit entity.  The objective of OIGIS is to meet the following outcome: 
Independent assurance for the Prime Minister, senior ministers and Parliament as to whether 
Australia’s intelligence and security agencies act legally and with propriety by inspecting, inquiring 
into and reporting on their activities.
OIGIS’s activities contributing towards this program are classified as departmental.  Departmental activities 
involve the use of assets, liabilities, income and expenses controlled or incurred by OIGIS in its own right. 
The continued existence of the OIGIS in its present form and with its present programs is dependent on 
government policy and on continuing funding by Parliament for OIGIS’s administration and programs. 
1.2 Basis of Preparation of the Financial Statements 
The financial statements are general purpose financial statements and are required by section 49 of the Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997. 
The Financial Statements and notes have been prepared in accordance with:
• Finance Minister’s Orders (or FMO) for reporting periods ending on or after 1 July 2011; and
• Australian Accounting Standards and Interpretations issued by the Australian Accounting Standards 
Board (AASB) that apply for the reporting period.   
The financial statements have been prepared on an accrual basis and in accordance with the historical cost 
convention, except for certain assets and liabilities at fair value.  Except where stated, no allowance is made for 
the effect of changing prices on the results or the financial position. 
The financial statements are presented in Australian dollars and values are rounded to the nearest dollar. 
Unless an alternative treatment is specifically required by an accounting standard or the FMOs, assets and 
liabilities are recognised in the statement of financial position when and only when it is probable that future 
economic benefits will flow to the entity or a future sacrifice of economic benefits will be required and the 
amounts of the assets or liabilities can be reliably measured.  However, assets and liabilities arising under 
executor contracts are not recognised unless required by an accounting standard.  Liabilities and assets that are 
unrecognised are reported in the schedule of commitments.
Unless alternative treatment is specifically required by an accounting standard, income and expenses are 
recognised in the Statement of Comprehensive Income when and only when the flow, consumption or loss of 
economic benefits has occurred and can be reliably measured.
1.3 Significant Accounting Judgments and Estimates 
In the process of applying the accounting policies listed in this note, OIGIS has made the following judgments 
that have the most significant impact on the amounts recorded in the financial statements. 
• Leave provisions involve assumptions on the likely tenure of existing staff, future salary movements and 
future discount rates. 
1.4 New Australian Accounting Standards
Adoption of New Australian Accounting Standard Requirements 
No accounting standard has been adopted earlier than the application date as stated in the standard. 
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NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
for year ended 30 June 2014 
New/revised standards, interpretations and amending standards that were issued prior to the sign-off date and are 
applicable to the current reporting period did not have a financial impact, and are not expected to have a future 
financial impact on the entity.
AASB 13 Fair Value Measurement has been adopted for the first time resulting in new disclosures (refer Note 5). 
Future Australian Accounting Standard Requirements 
New/revised standards, interpretations and amending standards that were issued prior to the sign-off date and are 
applicable to the future reporting periods are not expected to have a future financial impact on the entity. 
AASB 1055 Budgetary Reporting applicable from 1 July 2014 will result in significant changes in disclosure 
requirements.
1.5 Revenue
Revenue from Government 
Amounts appropriated for departmental appropriations for the year (adjusted for any formal additions and 
reductions) are recognised as Revenue from Government when OIGIS gains control of the appropriation, except 
for certain amounts that relate to activities that are reciprocal in nature, in which case revenue is recognised only 
when it has been earned.  Appropriations receivable are recognised at their nominal amounts. 
Other Types of Revenue
Revenue from the sale of goods is recognised when: 
• the risks and rewards of ownership have been transferred to the buyer; 
• the agency retains no managerial involvement or effective control over the goods; 
• the revenue and transaction costs incurred can be reliably measured; and
• it is probable that the economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the entity.
Revenue from rendering of services is recognised by reference to the stage of completion of contracts at the 
reporting date.  The revenue is recognised when: 
• the amount of revenue, stage of completion and transaction costs incurred can be reliably measured; and 
• the probable economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the entity.
The stage of completion of contracts at the reporting date is determined by reference to the proportion that costs 
incurred to date bear to the estimated total costs of the transaction. 
Receivables for goods and services, which have 30 day terms, are recognised at the nominal amounts due less any 
impairment allowance account.  Collectability of debts is reviewed as at end of reporting period.  Allowances are 
made when collectability of the debt is no longer probable. 
1.6 Gains
Resources Received Free of Charge
Resources received free of charge are recognised as gains when, and only when, a fair value can be reliably 
determined and the services would have been purchased if they had not been donated.  Use of those resources is 
recognised as an expense.
The main resources received free of charge in 2013-14 are office space (from the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet) and the installation and maintenance of the OIGIS owned internal secure computer network 
(from Defence Signals Directorate).  
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for year ended 30 June 2014 
Contributions of assets at no cost of acquisition or for nominal considerations are recognised as gains at their fair 
value when the asset qualifies for recognition, unless received from another Government agency or authority as a 
consequence of a restructuring of administrative arrangements.
Sale of Assets
Gains from disposal of assets are recognised when control of the asset has passed to the buyer. 
1.7 Transactions with the Government as Owner
Contributed Equity
Amounts appropriated which are designated as ‘equity injections’ for a year (less any formal reductions) and 
Departmental Capital Budgets (DCBs) are recognised directly to contributed equity in that year.
1.8 Employee Benefits
Liabilities for ‘short-term employee benefits’ (as defined in AASB 119 Employee Benefits) and termination 
benefits expected within twelve months of the end of the reporting period are measured at their nominal amounts. 
The nominal amount is calculated with regard to the rates expected to be paid on settlement of the liability.
Other long-term employee benefits are measured as net total of the present value of the defined benefit obligation 
at the end of the reporting period minus the fair value at the end of the reporting period of plan assets (if any) out 
of which the obligations are to be settled directly.
Leave
The liability for employee benefits includes provision for annual leave and long service leave.  No provision has 
been made for sick leave as all sick leave is non-vesting and the average sick leave taken in future years by 
employees of OIGIS is estimated to be less than the annual entitlement for sick leave.
The leave liabilities are calculated on the basis of employees’ remuneration at the estimated salary rates that will 
be applied at the time the leave is taken, including OIGIS’s employer superannuation contribution rates to the 
extent that the leave is likely to be taken during service rather than paid out on termination. 
The liability for long service leave has been determined by using the short hand method per the FMOs.  The 
estimate of the present value of the liability takes into account attrition rates and pay increases through promotion 
and inflation. 
Superannuation 
Staff of OIGIS are members of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (CSS), the Public Sector 
Superannuation Scheme (PSS), the PSS accumulation plan (PSSap) and other industry super funds outside the 
Commonwealth. 
The CSS and PSS are defined benefit schemes for the Australian Government.  The liability for defined benefits is 
recognised in the financial statements of the Australian Government and is settled by the Australian Government 
in due course.  This liability is reported in the Department of Finance’s administered schedules and notes. 
The PSSap is a defined contribution scheme. 
OIGIS makes employer contributions to the employees’ superannuation scheme at rates determined by an actuary 
to be sufficient to meet the current cost to the Government.  OIGIS accounts for the contributions as if they were 
contributions to defined contribution plans.
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for year ended 30 June 2014 
The liability for superannuation recognised as at 30 June represents outstanding contributions for the final 
fortnight of the year. 
1.9 Cash
Cash and cash equivalents includes cash on hand and any deposits in bank accounts with an original maturity of 3 
months or less that are readily convertible to known amounts of cash and subject to insignificant risk of changes 
in value.  Cash is recognised at its nominal amount.  
1.10 Financial Assets
OIGIS classifies its financial assets as ‘loans and receivables’.
Financial assets are recognised and derecognised upon trade date.
Effective Interest Method
The effective interest method is a method of calculating the amortised cost of a financial asset and of allocating 
interest income over the relevant period.  The effective interest rate is the rate that exactly discounts estimated 
future cash receipts through the expected life of the financial asset, or, where appropriate, a shorter period. 
Loans and receivables
Trade receivables, loans and other receivables that have fixed or determinable payments that are not quoted in an 
active market are classified as ‘loans and receivables’.  Loans and receivables are measured at amortised cost 
using the effective interest method less impairment.  Interest is recognised by applying the effective interest rate.
Credit terms are net 30 days (2012–13: 30 days). 
Impairment of financial assets
Financial assets are assessed for impairment at the end of each reporting period.
1.11 Financial Liabilities
Financial liabilities are classified as other financial liabilities.
Financial liabilities are recognised and derecognised upon ‘trade date’.
  
Other Financial Liabilities
Supplier and other payables are recognised at amortised cost.  Liabilities are recognised to the extent that the 
goods or services have been received (and irrespective of having been invoiced).
Settlement is usually made net 30 days.
1.12 Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets
Contingent liabilities and contingent assets are not recognised in the statement of financial position but are 
reported in the relevant schedules and notes.  They may arise from uncertainty as to the existence of a liability or 
asset or represent an asset or liability in respect of which the amount cannot be reliably measured.  Contingent 
assets are disclosed when settlement is probable but not virtually certain and contingent liabilities are disclosed 
when settlement is greater than remote.
OIGIS has no contingencies to report in either 2012-13 or in 2013-14. 
No contingent rentals exist.
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1.13 Acquisition of Assets
Assets are recorded at cost on acquisition except as stated below.  The cost of acquisition includes the fair value of 
assets transferred in exchange and liabilities undertaken.  Financial assets are initially measured at their fair value 
plus transaction costs where appropriate. 
Assets acquired at no cost, or for nominal consideration, are initially recognised as assets and income at their fair 
value at the date of acquisition, unless acquired as a consequence of restructuring of administrative arrangements.  
In the latter case, assets are initially recognised as contributions by owners at the amounts at which they were 
recognised in the transferor agency’s accounts immediately prior to the restructuring. 
1.14 Property, Plant and Equipment
Asset Recognition Threshold
Purchases of property, plant and equipment are recognised initially at cost in the statement of financial position,
except for purchases costing less than $2,000, which are expensed in the year of acquisition (other than where 
they form part of a group of similar items which are significant in total).
Revaluations
Fair values are determined by market selling price.
Following initial recognition at cost, property plant and equipment are carried at fair value less subsequent 
accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses.  Valuations are conducted with sufficient 
frequency to ensure that the carrying amounts of assets do not differ materially from the assets’ fair values as at 
the reporting date.  The regularity of independent valuations depends upon the volatility of movements in market 
values for the relevant assets.  A full revaluation was conducted at 30 June 2014 by an independent valuer. 
Revaluation adjustments are made on a class basis.  Any revaluation increment is credited to equity under the 
heading of asset revaluation reserve except to the extent that it reverses a previous revaluation decrement of the 
same asset class that was previously recognised in the surplus/deficit.  Revaluation decrements for a class of assets 
are recognised directly in the surplus/deficit except to the extent that they reverse a previous revaluation increment 
for that class.
Any accumulated depreciation as at the revaluation date is eliminated against the gross carrying amount of the 
asset and the asset restated to the revalued amount.
Depreciation
Depreciable property plant and equipment assets are written-off to their estimated residual values over their 
estimated useful lives to OIGIS using, in all cases, the straight-line method of depreciation. 
Depreciation rates (useful lives), residual values and methods are reviewed at each reporting date and necessary 
adjustments are recognised in the current, or current and future reporting periods, as appropriate.   
Depreciation rates of depreciable assets are based on useful lives of 1 – 14 years (2013:  1 – 47 years).
Impairment
All assets were assessed for impairment at 30 June 2014.  Where indicators of impairment were identified an 
assessment of recoverable value has been undertaken and the value of the assets adjusted accordingly.
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Derecognition
An item of property, plant and equipment is derecognised upon disposal or when no further future economic 
benefits are expected from its use or disposal.
1.15 Intangibles
Previously OIGIS’s intangibles have consisted of purchased software only.  These assets were carried at cost less 
accumulated amortisation and accumulated impairment losses.  Software is amortised on a straight-line basis over 
its anticipated useful life.  Software is assigned a useful life of 4 years (2013:  4 years).
All software assets were fully amortised as at 30 June 2009.
1.16 Taxation 
OIGIS is exempt from all forms of taxation except Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) and Goods and Services Tax 
(GST).
Revenues, expenses and assets are recognised net of GST except:
• where the amount of GST incurred is not recoverable from the Australian Taxation Office; and
• for receivables and payables.
1.17 Legal Compliance
The Australian Government  continues to have regard to developments in case law, including the High Court’s 
most recent decision on Commonwealth expenditure in Williams v Commonwealth (2014) HCA 23, as they 
contribute to the larger body of law relevant to the development of Commonwealth programs.  In accordance with 
its general practice, the Government will continue to monitor and assess risk and decide on any appropriate 
actions to respond to risks of expenditure not being consistent with constitutional or other legal requirements. 
Section 83 of the Constitution provides that no amount may be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue fund except 
under an appropriation made by law.  During 2012-13, the Department of Finance received additional legal advice 
that indicated there could be breaches of s83 under certain circumstances with payments for long service leave, 
goods and services tax (GST) and payments made under determinations of the Remuneration Tribunal. 
The agency has reviewed its processes and controls over payments for these items and determined that there is a 
low risk of the certain circumstances mentioned in the legal advice applying to the agency.  The agency has 
conducted testing of payments and found no breaches of Section 83 in respect of these items. 
Note 2 – Events after the Reporting Period
There are no significant events occurring after the Reporting Period requiring disclosure. 
54 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14
 P
A
R
T 
FO
U
R:
 F
IN
A
N
C
IA
L 
ST
AT
EM
EN
TS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
for year ended 30 June 2014 
Note 3 – Expenses
2014
$
2013
$
Note 3A – Employee Benefits
Wages and salaries 1 495 856 1 438 086
Superannuation:
Defined benefit plans 218 309 221 102
Defined contribution plans 53 396 48 226
Leave and other entitlements 148 498 278 343
Redundancy payment - 76 876
Total employee benefits 1 916 059 2 062 633
2014
$
2013
$
Note 3B – Suppliers
Goods and Services
Consultants 800 -
ICT support 46 000 46 000
Legal expenses 13 739 6 363
Printing non publications 7 837 8 969
Resources received free of charge:
Notional Rent Charge 102 000 102 000
Notional Audit Fees 18 000 18 000
Notional IT Support Costs 4 545 4 545
Stationery 5 452 9 572
Training 20 186 9 493
Travel 13 577 3 494
Other 33 888 27 737
Total goods and services 266 024 236 173
Goods and services are made up of:
Provision of goods – external entities 7 727 12 294
Rendering of services – related entities 211 009 189 189
Rendering of services – external entities 47 288 34 690
Total goods and services 266 024 236 173
Other supplier expenses
Workers compensation premiums 4 659 4 410
Total other supplier expenses 4 659 4 410
Total supplier expenses 270 683 240 583
      
2014
$
2013
$
Note 3C – Depreciation and Amortisation
Depreciation – Property, plant and equipment 37 999 39 608
Total depreciation and amortisation 37 999 39 608
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2014
$
2013
$
Note 3D – Loss on Disposal of Assets
Infrastructure, plant and equipment 2 474 -
Total loss on disposal of assets 2 474 -
Note 4 – Own-Source Income
OWN-SOURCE REVENUE
2014
$
2013
$
Note 4A – Other
Inquiry Funding 139 741 -
Leave Liability Transfers - 53 454
Employee FBT Contributions
Other
8 329
1 933
13 200
9 048
Resources Received Free of Charge:
Australian National Audit Office 18 000 18 000
Defence Signals Directorate 4 545 4 545
Total other own-source revenue 172 548 98 247
2014
$
2013
$
Note 4B – Other Gains
Resources Received Free of Charge:
Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet 102 000 102 000
Total other gains 102 000 102 000
REVENUE FROM GOVERNMENT
2014
$
2013
$
Note 4C – Revenue from Government
Appropriations:
Departmental Appropriation 2 179 000 2 180 000
Total revenue from government 2 179 000 2 180 000
Note 5 – Fair Value Measurement
The following table provides an analysis of assets and liabilities that are measured at fair value.  The different 
levels of the fair value hierarchy are defined below:
Level 1 – Quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the entity can access at 
measurement date.
Level 2 – Inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability, 
either directly or indirectly.
Level 3 – Unobservable inputs for the asset or liability.
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Note 5B – Level 1 and Level 2 Transfers for Recurring Fair Value Measurements
There were no transfers between levels during 2013-14. 
Note 5C – Valuation Technique and Inputs for Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Measurements 
Level 2 and 3 fair value measurements – valuation technique and the inputs used for assets and liabilities in 
2014 
Category 
(Level 2 or 
Level 3) Fair Value
Valuation 
Technique(s)1
Inputs 
used
Range 
(weighted 
average)2
Non-Financial Assets
Property, plant and equipment
Level 2 assets included office 
equipment and furniture 
Level 3 assets included computer 
equipment and office furniture 
Level 2
Level 3
30 035
33 700 
Market 
comparables 
Market 
comparables 
and 
depreciated 
replacement 
cost 
Sale prices 
of 
comparable 
assets
Sale prices 
of 
comparable 
assets in 
limited 
market and 
quotes for 
replacement 
assets 
adjusted for 
life of asset
NA
NA
1. No change in valuation technique occurred during the period. 
2. Significant unobservable inputs only.  Not applicable for assets or liabilities in the Level 2 category.
Recurring Level 3 fair value measurements – valuation processes 
OIGIS procured valuation services from B&A Valuers and relied on valuations provided by B&A Valuers.  B&A 
Valuers provided written assurance that the values determined are in compliance with AASB 13.
Following initial recognition at cost, property plant and equipment are carried at fair value less subsequent 
accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses.  Valuations are conducted with sufficient 
frequency to ensure that the carrying amounts of assets do not differ materially from the assets’ fair values as at 
the reporting date.  The regularity of independent valuations depends upon the volatility of movements in market 
values for the relevant assets.  A full revaluation was conducted at 30 June 2014 by an independent valuer. 
Impairment testing is undertaken each year including years in which no revaluation is undertaken. 
Recurring Level 3 fair value measurements – sensitivity of inputs
The significant unobservable inputs used in the measurement of the Level 3 assets include quotes obtained from 
suppliers for similar assets in new condition adjusted for the consumed economic benefit of the asset.  Significant 
changes in any of those inputs would result in a significantly different fair value measurement.
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Note 5D – Reconciliation for Recurring Level 3 Fair Value Measurements
Recurring Level 3 fair value measurements – reconciliation for assets
Non-financial assets
Property, plant and equipment Total
Opening balance 27 341 27 341
Total gain recognised in other 
comprehensive income1 6 359 6 359
Closing balance 33 700 33 700
1. These gains are included in the Statement of Comprehensive Income under ‘Changes in asset revaluation 
surplus’. 
OIGIS’s policy for determining when transfers between levels are deemed to have occurred can be found in Note 
1.   
Note 6 – Financial Assets
2014
$
2013
$
Note 6A – Cash and cash equivalents
Cash on hand or on deposit 207 005 203 783
Total cash and cash equivalents 207 005 203 783
2014
$
2013
$
Note 6B – Trade and other receivables
Appropriations receivable:
For existing programs 2 223 593 1 898 227
Total appropriation receivable 2 223 593 1 898 227
Other Receivables:
GST receivable from the Australian Taxation Office 153 245
Other receivables 6 457 4 482
Total other receivables 6 610 4 727
Total trade and other receivables (gross) 2 230 203 1 902 954
Less Impairment Allowance:
Other -
Total trade and other receivables (net) 2 230 203 1 902 954
Receivables are aged as follows:
Not overdue 2 230 203 1 902 825
All receivables are expected to be recovered in less than 12 months.
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Note 7 – Non-Financial Assets
2014
$
2013
$
Note 7A – Property, plant and equipment
Other property, plant and equipment:
Fair value 63 735 163 659
Accumulated depreciation - (77 016)
Total property, plant and equipment 63 735 86 643
All revaluations are independent and are conducted in accordance with the revaluation policy stated in Note 1.16.  
The most recent revaluation was conducted by the B&A Valuers as at 30 June 2014.   
All assets were examined for indicators of impairment during the stocktake completed on 30 June 2014 and none 
were found.  No items of property plant and equipment are expected to be sold or disposed of within the next 12 
months. 
Note 7B – Reconciliation of the Opening and Closing Balances of Property, Plant and Equipment (2013-14) 
Item
Other property, 
plant & 
equipment
$
Total 
$
As at 1 July 2013
Gross book value 165 059 165 059
Accumulated depreciation and impairment (78 416) (78 416)
Net book value as at 1 July 2013 86 643 86 643
Additions
by purchase 8 258 8 258
resources received free of charge - -
Revaluations and impairments recognised in other comprehensive income 9 308 9 308
Depreciation expense (37 999) (37 999)
Disposals (2 475) (2 475)
Other - -
Net Book Value 30 June 2014 63 735 63 735
Net Bank Value as at 30 June 2014 represented by:
Gross book value 63 735 63 735
Accumulated depreciation and impairment - -
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Note 7B – Reconciliation of the Opening and Closing Balances of Property, Plant and Equipment (2012-13) 
Item
Other property, 
plant & 
equipment
$
Total 
$
As at 1 July 2012
Gross book value 165 059 165 059
Accumulated depreciation and impairment (38 809) (38 809)
Net book value as at 1 July 2012 126 250 126 250
Additions
by purchase - -
resources received free of charge - -
Depreciation expense (39 608) (39 608)
Disposals - -
Other - -
Net Book Value 30 June 2013 86 643 86 643
Net Bank Value as at 30 June 2013 represented by:
Gross book value 165 059 165 059
Accumulated depreciation and impairment (78 416) (78 416)
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2014
$
2013
$
Note 7C – Other Non-Financial Assets
Prepayments - 3 341
Total other non-financial assets - 3 341
All other non-financial assets are expected to be recovered in less than 12 months.
Note 8 – Payables 
2014
$
2013
$
Note 8A - Suppliers
Trade creditors and accruals 38 800 4 958
Total suppliers 38 800 4 958
Supplier payables expected to be settled within 12 months:
Related entities 28 882 3 203
External parties 9 918 1 755
Total 38 800 4 958
Supplier payables expected to be settled in greater than 12 months:
Related entities - -
External parties - -
Total - -
Total supplier payables 38 800 4 958
2014
$
2013
$
Note 8B – Other Payables
Salaries and wages 48 968 45 514
Superannuation 8 411 7 294
Other 20 847
Total other payables 78 226 52 808
Total other payables are expected to be settled in:
No more than 12 months 78 226 52 808
Total other payables 78 226 52 808
Note 9 – Provisions 
2014
$
2013
$
Note 9A – Employee Provisions
Leave 730 388 737 067
Total employee provisions 730 388 737 067
Employee provisions are expected to be settled in:
No more than 12 months 106 878 129 171
More than 12 months 623 510 607 896
Total employee provisions 730 388 737 067
62 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14
 P
A
R
T 
FO
U
R:
 F
IN
A
N
C
IA
L 
ST
AT
EM
EN
TS NOTES TO AND FORMING PART OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
for year ended 30 June 2014 
Note 10 – Cash Flow Reconciliation
2014
$
2013
$
Reconciliation of Cash and cash equivalents as per Statement of 
Financial Position to Cash flow statement
Report cash and cash equivalents as per:
Cash Flow Statement 207 005 203 783
Statement of Financial Position 207 005 203 783
Difference - -
Reconciliation of net cost of services to net cash from operating 
activities:
Net cost of services (1 952 667) (2 142 577)
Add revenue from Government 2 179 000 2 180 000
Less income tax expense
Adjustments for non-cash items
Depreciation/amortisation 37 999 39 608
Loss on disposal of assets 2 474 -
Write-off of assets -
Movements in assets and liabilities
Increase/(Decrease) in provision of employee liabilities (6 679) (46 156)
Increase/(Decrease) in other payables 25 418 2 527
Increase/(Decrease) in supplier trade creditors 28 308 (14 604)
(Increase)/Decrease in appropriation receivables (317 623) (6 568)
(Increase)/Decrease in other assets (1 975) (4 108)
(Increase)/Decrease in other prepayments 3 341 (2 157)
(Increase)/Decrease in GST receivable 92 466
Net cash from (used by) operating activities (2 312) 6 431
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Note 11 – Senior Executive Remuneration
2014
$
2013
$
Note 11A – Senior Executive Remuneration Expense for the Reporting 
Period
Short-term employee benefits:
Salary 544 682 511 066
Annual leave accrued - -
Total short-term employee benefits 544 682 511 066
Post-employment benefits:
Superannuation 82 538 79 082
Total post-employment benefits 82 538 79 082
Other long-term employee benefits:
Annual Leave Accrued 39 404 39 405
Long Service Leave (2 802) 34 258
Total other long-term employee benefits 36 602 73 663
Termination benefits - -
Total senior executive remuneration expenses 663 822 663 811
Notes:
1. Note 11A was prepared on an accrual basis.
2. Note 11A excludes acting arrangements and part-year service where remuneration expensed for senior 
executive was less than $195,000. 
3. Note 11A relates to senior executives employed during the year.
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Note 12 – Remuneration of Auditor
Financial statement audit services were provided free of charge to OIGIS by the Australian National Audit Office.
Fair Value of the services provided 2014 2013
Financial statement audit services $18 000 $18 000
No other services were provided by the auditors of the financial statements.
Note 13 – Financial Instruments
2014
$
2013
$
Note 13A – Categories of Financial Instruments
Financial Assets
Loans and Receivables
Loans and receivables
Cash and cash equivalents 207 005 203 783
Trade receivables 6 457 4 482
Total financial assets 213 462 208 265
Financial Liabilities
Other liabilities measured at amortised cost
Payables – Suppliers 38 800 4 958
Total financial liabilities 38 800 4 958
Note 13B – Net Gains or Losses on Financial Assets
There were no net gains or losses on financial assets.
Note 13C – Net Gains or Losses on Financial Liabilities
There were no net gains or losses on financial liabilities.
Note 13D – Fair Value of Financial Instruments
OIGIS’s aggregate net fair values of (identified) financial instruments are the same as their carrying amounts.
Note 13E – Credit Risk
OIGIS has endorsed policies and procedures for debt management (including the provision of credit terms), to 
reduce the incidence of credit risk.  In most instances debtors for OIGIS are other government entities and 
therefore represent minimal credit risk.
The carrying amount of financial assets, net of impairment losses, reported in the statement of financial position 
represents the Agencies maximum exposure to credit risk. 
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Credit quality of financial instruments not past due or individually determined or impaired
Not Past Due 
Nor Impaired 
2014
Not Past Due 
Nor Impaired 
2013
Past due or 
Impaired 
2014
Past due or 
Impaired 
2013
Loans & Receivables
Cash and cash equivalents 207 005 203 783 - -
Trade receivables 6 457 4 482 - -
Total 213 462 208 265 - -
Note 13F – Liquidity Risk
OIGIS’s financial liabilities only include payables.  Any exposure to liquidity risk is based on the notion that 
OIGIS will encounter difficulty in meeting its obligations associated with financial liabilities.  This is highly 
unlikely due to appropriation funding and internal policies and procedures put in place to ensure there are 
appropriate resources to meet its financial obligations. 
Maturities for non-derivative financial liabilities 2014 
On Demand
$
Within 1 year
$
1 to 5 years 
$
Greater than
5 years
$
Total
$
Other Liabilities at amortised 
cost
Payable – Suppliers 38 800 38 800
Total 38 800 38 800
Maturities for non-derivative financial liabilities 2013 
On Demand
$
Within 1 year
$
1 to 5 years 
$
Greater than
5 years
$
Total
$
Other Liabilities at amortised 
cost
Payable – Suppliers 4 958 4 958
Total 4 958 4 958
Note 13G – Market Risk
OIGIS holds only basic financial instruments that do not expose the agency to certain market risks.
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Note 14 – Financial Asset Reconciliation
2014
$
2013
$
Financial Assets
Total financial assets as per statement of 
financial position
2 437 208 2 106 737
Less: non-financial instrument components:
Appropriation Receivable     2 223 593 1 898 227
GST Receivable 153 245
Total non-financial instrument components 2 223 746 1 898 472
Total financial assets as per financial 
instruments note 213 462 208 265
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Table C:  Unspent Departmental Annual Appropriations (‘Recoverable GST exclusive)
Authority
2014
$
2013
$
Appropriation Act (No 2) 2004-051 - 53 000
Appropriation Act (No 1) 2010-11 – DCB 1 874 10 131
Appropriation Act (No 1) 2011-12 – DCB 9 000 9 000
Appropriation Act (No 1) 2012-13 - 1 826 096
Appropriation Act (No 1) 2013-14 2 142 718 -
Appropriation Act (No 1) 2013-14 - DCB 69 000
Cash 207 005 203 783
Total Departmental 2 429 597 2 102 010
1. Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2004-2004 repealed by the Statute Stocktake (Appropriations) Act 2013 with 
effect from 1 July 2014.  The effect has been reflected in the Statement of Financial Position in Contributed 
Equity.
Note 16 – Compensation and Debt Relief
No ‘Act of Grace’ payments were expensed during the reporting period, (2012-13: nil).
No waivers of amounts owing to the Australian Government were made pursuant to subsection 34(1) of the 
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 during the reporting period, (2012-13: nil).
No payments were made under the ‘Defective Administration Scheme’ during the reporting period, (2012-13: nil).
No ex-gratia payments were provided for during the reporting period, (2012-13: nil).
No payments were made under section 73 of the Public Service Act 1999, (2012-13: nil).
Note 17 – Reporting of Outcomes
There is only one outcome for OIGIS as detailed in the objectives in Note 1.1. 
Note 17A – Net Cost of Outcome Delivery
Outcome 1 Total
2014 2013 2014 2013
$ $ $ $
Departmental
Expenses 2 227 215 2 342 824 2 227 215 2 342 824
Own-source income 274 548 200 247 274 548 200 247
Net cost/(contribution) of outcome delivery 1 952 667 2 142 577 1 952 667 2 142 577
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Note 18 – Net Cash Appropriation Arrangements
2014
$
2013
$
Total Comprehensive Income (loss) less 
depreciation/amortisation expenses previously funded through 
revenue appropriations1 273 640 77 031
Plus depreciation/amortisation expenses previously funded through 
revenue appropriation (37 999) (39 608)
Total comprehensive income (loss) as per the Statement of 
Comprehensive Income 235 641 37 423
1.   From 2010-11, the Government introduced net cash appropriation arrangements, where revenue 
appropriations for depreciation/amortisation expenses ceased.  Entities now receive a separate capital budget 
provided through equity appropriations.  Capital budgets are to be appropriated in the period when cash payment 
for capital expenditure is required. 
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Annex 1: Summary of Inquiries 
and Complaints
Table 1.1 IGIS Act Inquiries actioned between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2014
Agency Source Inquiry Date initiated Date finalised Duration 
(days)
ASIS IGIS The provision of weapons 
and the training in and 
use of weapons and  
self-defence techniques 
by ASIS 
15 April 2013 29 November 2013 228
ASIO IGIS The attendance of legal 
representatives at ASIO 
interviews
1 May 2013 24 January 2014 268
ASIO/DIAC/
AFP
Prime 
Minister 
The matter of an Egyptian 
irregular maritime arrival 
who was the subject of an 
Interpol red notice [Mr E]
6 June 2013 13 March 2014 280
ASIS IGIS The management of 
weapons by ASIS in a 
particular location
10 June 2014 Ongoing
Table 1.2 Summary of complaints handled administratively by OIGIS between  
1 July 2013 and 30 June 2014
Agency Number of 
complaints
From public From intelligence agency 
employee or ex-employee
ASIO (visa security 
assessments)
487 487 0
ASIO (all other 
complaints)
13 8 5
ASIS 2 0 2
DSD 2 2 0
DIGO 0 0 0
DIO 0 0 0
ONA 0 0 0
TOTAL Complaints 504 497 7
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Employees in OIGIS in 2013–14
OIGIS Band APS Level Salary Range
1 July 2013–30 June 2014 ($)
SES Band 1 SES Band 1 179 4587
OIGIS Band 4 EL2 133 967
130 796
128 258
119 013
112 564
OIGIS Band 3 EL1 107 810
104 635
96 710
OIGIS Band 2 APS6 89 973
87 199
84 027
80 063
APS5 76 101
74 513
72 531
70 155
APS4 68 569
66 586
65 003
63 021
OIGIS Band 1 APS3 61 038
59 453
57 866
56 680
APS2 55 092
53 509
51 129
49 543
APS1 48 355
46 373
45 184
45 138
7  The salary reported in the 2012–13 annual report was incorrect and should have been reported as $174 232.
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Annex 3: Agency resource statements
Table 3.1 Agency Resource Statement and Resources for Outcomes 2013-14
Actual available 
appropriation 
for 2013-14  
$’000 
(a)
Payments made 
2013-14  
$’000 
(b)
Balance 
remaining  
2013-14 
(a) – (b) 
Ordinary Annual Services
Departmental Appropriation
 Prior year departmental 
 appropriation
 Departmental appropriation
 S31 Relevant Agency Receipts
2 049
2 248
  410
2 038
  238
   -
     11
2 010
   410
 Total 4 707 2 276 2 431
 Administered expenses - - -
 Total - - -
Total ordinary annual services A 4 707 2 276 2 431
Other services
 Departmental non-operating -    - -
 Total -    - -
Total other services B -   - -
Total available annual appropriations 4 707 2 276  2 431
Special appropriations - - -
Total special appropriations C - - -
Special accounts - - -
Total special accounts D - - -
Total resourcing 
A + B + C + D 4 707 2 276 2 431
Less appropriations drawn from annual or 
special appropriations above and credited 
to special accounts and/or CAC Act 
bodies through annual appropriations
- - -
Total net resourcing for agency 4 707 2 276 2 431
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Outcome 1: Independent assurance for the 
Prime Minister, senior ministers and Parliament 
as to whether Australia’s intelligence and 
security agencies act legally and with propriety 
by inspecting, inquiring into and reporting on  
their activities
Budget 
2013-14 
$’000 
(a)
Actual 
expenses  
2013-14  
$’000 
(b)
Variation  
2013-14 
$’000 
(a) – (b) 
Program 1.1: Office of the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security
Departmental expenses
 Ordinary annual services
 (Appropriation Bill No.1) 2 178 2 179 (1)
 Revenue from independent sources 150 (150)
 Special appropriations
 Special Accounts
 Expenses not requiring appropriation  
 in the Budget year
131 163 (32)
Total for Program 1.1 2 309 2 492 (183)
Outcome 1 Totals by appropriation type
Departmental expenses
 Ordinary annual services
 (Appropriation Bill No.1) 2 178 2 179 (1)
 Revenue from independent sources    150 (150)
 Special appropriations
 Special Accounts
 Expenses not requiring appropriation
 in the Budget year 131 163 (32)
Total expenses for Outcome 1 2 309 2 492 (183)
Budget
2013-14
Actual
2013-14
Average Staffing Level (number) 12 12 -
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Annex 4: Requirements for  
Annual Reports
Description Requirement Part of Report Page
Letter of transmittal Mandatory Preliminary i
Table of contents Mandatory Preliminary ii–iii
Index Mandatory Annex 86–92
Glossary Mandatory Preliminary iv
Contact officer(s) Mandatory Preliminary inside front 
cover
Internet home page address and internet address  
for report
Mandatory Preliminary inside front 
cover
Review by agency head Mandatory Overview 3–5
Summary of significant issues and developments Suggested Overview 1–5
Overview of agency’s performance and  
financial results
Suggested Overview 1–5, 31–2
Outlook for following year Suggested Overview 5
Significant issues and developments – portfolio Portfolio 
departments – 
suggested
Overview N/A
Role and functions Mandatory Overview 1, 4, 5
Organisational structure Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
33
Outcome and programme structure Mandatory Performance 6–7, 80
Where outcome and programme structures 
differ from PB Statements/PAES or other portfolio 
statements accompanying any other additional 
appropriation bills (other portfolio statements), 
details of variation and reasons for change
Mandatory Performance N/A
Portfolio structure Portfolio 
departments – 
mandatory
N/A N/A
Review of performance during the year in relation  
to programmes and contribution to outcomes
Mandatory Performance 6–32
Actual performance in relation to deliverables  
and KPIs set out in PB Statements/PAES or other 
portfolio statements
Mandatory Performance 6–32
Where performance targets differ from the PBS/PAES, 
details of both former and new targets, and reasons 
for the change
Mandatory N/A N/A
Narrative discussion and analysis of performance Mandatory Performance 6–32
Trend information Mandatory Performance 15–16, 32
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Significant changes in nature of principal  
functions/services
Suggested N/A N/A
Performance of purchaser/provider arrangements If applicable, 
suggested
Management & 
Accountability
34, 36
Factors, events or trends influencing  
agency performance
Suggested Overview 1–5, 18
Contribution of risk management in achieving 
objectives
Suggested Management & 
Accountability
3, 33–34
Performance against service charter customer 
service standards, complaints data, and the 
department’s response to complaints
If applicable – 
mandatory
N/A N/A
Discussion and analysis of the department’s  
financial performance
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
31–2
Discussion of any significant changes in financial 
results from the prior year, from budget or 
anticipated to have a significant impact on  
future operations
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
31–2
Agency resource statement and summary resource 
tables by outcomes
Mandatory Annex 79–80
Agency heads are required to certify that their 
agency complies with the ‘Commonwealth  
Fraud Control Guidelines’
Mandatory Preliminary i
Statement of the main corporate governance 
practices in place
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
33–5
Names of the senior executive and their 
responsibilities
Suggested Management & 
Accountability
33
Senior management committees and their roles Suggested Management & 
Accountability
33
Corporate and operational plans and associated 
performance reporting and review
Suggested Management & 
Accountability
33, 4
Internal audit arrangements including approach 
adopted to identifying areas of significant financial  
or operational risk and arrangements to manage 
those risks
Suggested Management & 
Accountability
33, 4
Policy and practices on the establishment and 
maintenance of appropriate ethical standards
Suggested Management & 
Accountability
34
How nature and amount of remuneration for  
SES officers is determined
Suggested Management & 
Accountability
34–5
Significant developments in external scrutiny Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
4, 35
Judicial decisions and decisions of administrative 
tribunals and by the Australian Information 
Commissioner
Mandatory Overview 4
83Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14
 PA
R
T FIVE: A
N
N
EX
 4
Description Requirement Part of Report Page
Reports by the Auditor-General, a Parliamentary 
Committee, the Commonwealth Ombudsman  
or an agency capability review
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
4, 35
Assessment of effectiveness in managing 
and developing human resources to achieve 
departmental objectives
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
35–6
Workforce planning, staff turnover and retention Suggested Management & 
Accountability
35–6
Impact and features of enterprise or collective 
agreements, individual flexibility arrangements  
(IFAs), determinations, common law contracts  
and Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs)
Suggested Management & 
Accountability
34–5, 36
Training and development undertaken and its 
impact
Suggested Management & 
Accountability
36
Work health and safety performance Suggested Management & 
Accountability
38
Productivity gains Suggested Management & 
Accountability
3–4, 12, 18
Statistics on staffing Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
35
Enterprise or collective agreements, IFAs, 
determinations, common law contracts and AWAs
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability; 
Annex 2 Salary 
ranges
34–5, 36
Performance pay Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
36
Assessment of effectiveness of assets management If applicable – 
mandatory
N/A 31–2
Assessment of purchasing against core policies  
and principles
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
34, 36
Summary statement detailing the number of new 
consultancy services let during the year; the total 
actual expenditure on all new consultancy contracts 
let during the year (inclusive of GST); the number of 
ongoing consultancy contracts that were active in 
the reporting year; and the total actual expenditure 
in the reporting year on the ongoing consultancy 
contracts (inclusive of GST). A statement noting  
that information on contracts and consultancies  
is available through the AusTender website.
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
36
Absence of provisions in contracts allowing access 
by the Auditor-General
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
36
Contracts exempted from publication in AusTender Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
37
84 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14
 P
A
R
T 
FI
VE
: A
N
N
EX
 4 Description Requirement Part of Report Page
Financial Statements Mandatory Financial 
Statements
39–75
Work health and safety (Schedule 2, Part 4 of  
the Work Health and Safety Act 2011)
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
38
Advertising and Market Research (section 311A of 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) and statement 
on advertising campaigns
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
37
Ecologically sustainable development and 
environmental performance (section 516A of the
Environment Protection and Biodiversity  
Conservation Act 1999)
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
37
Compliance with the agency’s obligations under the 
Carer Recognition Act 2010
If applicable, 
mandatory
N/A N/A
Grant programmes Mandatory N/A N/A
Disability reporting – explicit and transparent 
reference to agency-level information available 
through other reporting mechanisms
Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
38
Information Publication Scheme statement Mandatory Management & 
Accountability
37
Correction of material errors in previous  
annual report
If applicable – 
mandatory
N/A N/A
Agency Resource Statements and  
Resources for Outcomes
Mandatory Annex 3 79–80
List of requirements Mandatory Annex 4 81–4
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Accountable Authority Instructions, 34
address and contact details, inside front cover
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1, 14–15
administrative tribunals, 1, 4
advertising and market research, 37
agency resource statements, 79–80
alcohol consumption, 11
analytic independence inquiry of 2012–13, 
implementation of recommendations, 17
ANAO see Australian National Audit Office
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism 
Financing Act 2006, 30–1
Archives Act 1983
IGIS role in FOI and Archives matters, 1, 14–15
asset management, 31–2
Assistant Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security, 7, 33
assumed identities, 30
Attorney-General, 2, 22, 23, 31
ASIO submissions to, 18
reporting on warrants to, 19
Attorney-General’s Guidelines, 18, 20
Audit Committee, 33–4, 38
Auditor-General, 35  see also Australian National 
Audit Office
audits
independent auditor’s report, 31, 35
internal audit, 33–4
AusCheck, 14
AusTender, 36, 37
Australian Federal Police, 4, 9–10
Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation see 
Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation 
(DIGO)
Australian Government Solicitors, 37
Australian Human Rights Commission referrals to 
OIGIS, 13
Australian Intelligence Community see intelligence 
agencies
Australian National Audit Office
access clauses, 36
and accountability of AIC agencies, 1
audit report, 31, 35
Australian persons, communication and retention of 
intelligence on see privacy rules compliance
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)
assumed identities, 30
AUSTRAC information access and use, 31
complaints, 13, 77
employment related matters, 13
IGIS briefings for ASIS officers, 7
inquiries relating to, 10–11, 77
inspections of, 24–6, 30, 31
ministerial authorisations to collect intelligence, 
24–5
new powers proposed, 5
privacy rules, 23–5
procedural changes as a result of IGIS 
recommendations, 11, 25
recordkeeping, 31
review of operational files, 25
role and functions, 2, 23
weapons use and issues, 10–11, 26
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)
analytic independence inquiry of 2012–13, 
implementation of recommendations, 17
assumed identities, 30
AUSTRAC information access and use, 31
complaints (non visa-related), 13, 77
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complaints (visa-related), 8–10, 12, 77
employment related matters, 13–14
exchange of information with foreign liaisons, 
21–2
IGIS briefings for ASIO officers, 7
information sharing, 9–10
information use within ASIO, 22
inquiries relating to, 4, 8–10, 77
inspections of, 18–22, 31
investigations by, 19
legal representation at ASIO interviews, 4, 8–9
management of Mr E (asylum seeker) case, 9–10
Preservation Notices (telecommunications data), 
21
procedural changes as a result of IGIS 
recommendations, 9, 10, 22
questioning and detention warrants, 20
recordkeeping, 17, 18, 19
role and powers, 2, 5, 18, 21
taxation information access, 21
telecommunications data and interceptions, 
19–21
warrant operations, 19–20
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 
(ASIO Act), 2, 13, 18, 21
breaches of, 19, 20
Australian Signals Directorate see Defence Signals 
Directorate (DSD)
Australian Taxation Office (ATO), 21
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC), 30–1
Aviation Security Identification Cards, 14
B
Blight, Jake, 7, 33, 34
briefings
for IGIS by agencies, 7
by IGIS for agency officers, 7
business processes, 3
C
changes in agency procedures see procedural 
changes as a result of IGIS recommendations
Chief Executive Instructions, 34
codes of conduct, 34
collaboration
Immigration/ASIO/AFP, 8, 9–10
OIGIS/Ombudsman, 13
Commissioner of Taxation, 21
Commonwealth Disability Strategy, 38
Commonwealth Ombudsman, 4, 13, 30, 35
complaints handling, 11–14
contacts handled administratively, 16
employment-related matters, 13–14
non visa-related, 13, 16, 77
numbers and trends, 15–16, 77
OIGIS engagement with other agencies, 13, 14
role of IGIS, 1, 11–12
summary, 77
timeliness, 17
visa-related, 8–10, 12, 15–16, 77
see also inquiries
consultants, 36
contact details, inside front cover
contracts, 36–7
corporate and operational planning, 33
corporate governance, 33–5
court decisions, 4
Crimes Act 1914, 30
cross-agency inspections, 30–1
currency movements, 31
Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act 2012, 21
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Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation 
(DIGO), 2
complaints handled administratively by OIGIS, 
77
inspections of, 29–30
privacy rules, 23–4
role, 2–3
Defence intelligence agencies, 2–3
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)
analytic independence inquiry (2012–13), 
implementation of recommendations, 17
complaints handled administratively by OIGIS, 77
inspections of, 30
privacy guidelines compliance, 30
recordkeeping, 17
role, 2–3
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), 2
complaints handled administratively  
by OIGIS, 13, 77
inspections of, 26–9
ministerial authorisations to collect  
intelligence, 26–9
privacy rules, 23–4, 27, 29
procedural changes as a result of IGIS 
recommendations, 27, 28–9
recordkeeping, 28, 29
role, 3
TIA Act compliance, 28
delegations (administrative), 34
deliverables, 6
Department of Defence, 2  see also Minister  
for Defence
Department of Immigration and Border Protection 
see Immigration
Department of Immigration and Citizenship see 
Immigration
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,  
36, 37
Director-General of ASIS, 11, 24, 25, 26, 30
Director-General of Security (ASIO), 21, 30
disability reporting, 38
E
ecologically sustainable development, 37
effecting change in agencies see procedural 
changes as a result of IGIS recommendations
Egyptian irregular maritime arrival, and actions of 
Commonwealth agencies, 4, 9–10
employment (OIGIS), 34–5, 36
employment-related grievances within intelligence 
agencies, 13–14
engagement of IGIS with intelligence agencies, 7
enterprise agreements, 36
environmental performance, 37
ethical standards, 34
exchange of information see information sharing
exempt contracts, 37
expenditure, 31, 80
expert evidence provision, 1
external scrutiny, 4, 35
F
financial intelligence information, 21, 30–1
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, 
33, 34
financial performance
agency resource statements, 79–80
summary, 31–2
financial statements, 35, 39–75
firearms, 11
foreign agencies, exchange of information with, 
21–2, 27
foreign conflicts, Australians involved in, 20
fraud control, i, 34
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freedom of information
IGIS role in FOI and Archives matters, 1, 14–15
OIGIS as exempt agency (FOI Act), 37
Freedom of Information Act 1982, 1, 14, 37
functions
intelligence agencies, 2–3
OIGIS, 1, 4, 5
funding, 31–2, 79–80
future (outlook), 5
G
glossary, iv
H
Health and Safety Representative, 38
highlights of year, 3–4
human resources management, 35–6
human rights and discrimination matters, 22
human source operations (ASIO), 18
I
identities, assumed, 30
Immigration
information sharing and recordkeeping, 8, 9–10
inquiries relating to, 4, 8–10
procedural changes as a result of IGIS 
recommendations, 10
immigration detention, 4
independent auditor’s report, 31, 35
Information Commissioner, 1, 4
Information Publication Scheme, 37
information sharing
Immigration/ASIO/AFP, 8, 9–10
inquiries
completed, 4, 8–11, 77
employment of persons for a particular inquiry, 
35
implementation of recommendations see 
procedural changes as a result of IGIS 
recommendations
inquiry function and powers, 1, 7–8
legal representation at ASIO interviews, 4, 8–9
numbers and trends, 15
ongoing, 11, 77
requested by Prime Minister, 9–10
timeliness, 16–17
workload, 4
inspections
agencies subject to ISA Act, 23–4
ASIO activities, 18–22, 31
ASIS activities, 24–6, 30, 31
AUSTRAC access and use, 30–1
cross-agency inspections, 30–1
DIGO activities, 29–30
DIO privacy guideline adherence, 30
DSD activities, 26–9
forward plan, 33
ONA privacy guideline adherence, 30
overview of activities, 18
role of IGIS, 1
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, 33
briefings, 7
review of year, 3–5
role and powers, 1, 4, 5
submissions to inquiries and reviews, 5
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, 
1, 13
intelligence agencies, 2–3
AUSTRAC information access and use, 30–1
complaints (non visa-related), 13, 16
complaints against agencies see complaints 
handling; inquiries
cross-agency inspections, 30–1 see also 
inspections
effecting change in agencies see procedural 
changes as a result of IGIS recommendations
employment-related grievances, 13–14
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inspection of, 23–31
limits to functions, 23
oversight of, 1, 5
public interest disclosure scheme, 4, 14, 16, 30
regular points of contact (officers), 7
roles and functions, 2–3
Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA), 2, 3
agencies subject to ISA Act see intelligence 
agencies
breaches of, 11, 13, 16, 24–5, 26, 29
limits on intelligence agencies’ functions, 23
privacy rules, 23–5
internal audit, 33–4
Internet home page, inside front cover
Interpol red notices, 4, 9, 10
irregular maritime arrivals
complaints about security assessments, 15
inquiry concerning actions of Commonwealth 
agencies concerning Mr E, 4, 9–10
J
judicial decisions, 4
K
key performance indicators, 6–7
key strategies, 6
L
leadership groups addressed by Inspector-General, 7
learning and development, 36
legacy incidents, 27, 28–9
legal representation at ASIO interviews, 4, 8–9
legal services, 37
legislation (enabling Act), 1
legislative changes, 4
letter of transmittal, i
M
management and accountability (OIGIS), 33–8
Maritime Security Identification Cards, 14
market research, 37
memoranda of understanding, 13, 21, 31
Minister for Defence, 3, 26, 27, 28, 29
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2, 31
ministerial authorisations to collect intelligence, 
23–30
N
National Disability Strategy, 38
national intelligence priorities, 23
national security, 2, 3, 5, 10
National Security Committee of Cabinet, 23
National Security Legislation Amendment Bill  
(No. 1) 2014, 5
nationality, presumption of, 23, 24–5, 27, 29
natural disasters, 3
non-salary benefits, 36
notifiable incidents (WHS), 38
O
Office of National Assessments (ONA)
complaints handled administratively by OIGIS, 
77
inspections of, 30
privacy rules compliance, 30
role, 2
Office of National Assessments Act 1977 (ONA Act), 2
Ombudsman, 4, 13, 30, 35
operational files, review of, 25
operational planning (OIGIS), 33
organisational structure, 33
outcome and program, 6–7
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financial performance summary, 31–2
performance report, 6–32
resources for outcome, 79–80
outlook, 5
outreach program, 7
overview by Inspector-General, 3–5
P
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security, 1, 5
parliamentary oversight of OIGIS, 4, 35
performance indicators, 6–7
performance pay, 36
performance report, 6–32
personal information in ASIO files, 22  see also 
privacy rules compliance
personal security see protective security
planning (OIGIS), 33, 34
Portfolio Budget Statements, 6
portfolio relationship, 1
powers of IGIS, 1  see also roles and functions (IGIS)
presentations and outreach, 7
Preservation Notices (stored  
telecommunications data), 21
Prime Minister, 1, 2, 5
inquiry requests, 9–10
see also Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet
priorities
risk-based approach to prioritising work, 3
privacy rules compliance, 22, 23–5, 27, 29, 30
procedural changes as a result of IGIS 
recommendations, 17–18
AFP, 10
ASIO, 9, 10, 22
ASIS, 11, 25
DSD, 27, 28–9
Immigration, 10
procurement, 34, 36
program, 6–7
protection for complainants/information providers, 8
protective security, 34
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability 
Act 2013, 34
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2103, 4
Public Interest Disclosure scheme, 4, 14, 16, 30
Public Service Act 1999 code of conduct provisions, 13
purchasing, 34, 36
Q
questioning and detention warrants, 20
R
recordkeeping
ASIO, 17, 18, 19
ASIS, 31
DIO, 17
DSD, 28, 29
Immigration, 9–10
value of, 13
remuneration
APS employees, 36, 78
non-salary benefits, 36
SES, 34–5
resources for outcome, 79–80
risk management, 33–4
risk-based approach to prioritising work, 3
roles and functions
intelligence agencies, 2–3
OIGIS, 1, 4, 5
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security
defined, 2
clearances for OIGIS staff, 36
policy for use of information holdings within 
ASIO, 22
protective security, 34
visa applicant checks see visa security 
assessment processes
self-defence techniques, 10–11, 26
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References 
Committee, 5
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and  
Public Administration, 4
senior executive, 33
Senior Executive Service (SES) officer remuneration, 
34–5
senior management committees, 33
staff, 35–6, 80
strategies, 6
structure (organisational), 33
study assistance, 36
submissions to inquiries and reviews, 5
T
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (TAA), 21
taxation information, 21
Telecommunications (Interception and Access)  
Act 1979 (TIA Act), 5, 19–21, 28
telecommunications interception warrants, 19–20
telecommunications locational information or 
subscriber data, 20–1
tendering see purchasing
Thom, Vivienne, 1, 33  see also Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security
training and development, 36
trends
finances, 32
inquiries and complaints, 15–16
tribunal decisions, 4
V
visa security assessment processes
complaints handling, 12
complaints numbers and trends, 15–16
interviews, 4, 8–9
new processes, 12
shortcomings addressed, 9–10
W
warrant operations by ASIO, 19–20
weapons use and issues, 10–11, 26
website address, inside front cover
whistleblower protection scheme see Public Interest 
Disclosure scheme
Work Health and Safety Act 2011, 38
work health and safety (OIGIS), 38
workload, 4, 5, 18
workplace agreements, 36
Y
year in review, 3–5
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